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Abstract
Ambiguity sensitive preferences must fail either Consequentialism or Dynamic Con-
sistency (DC), two properties that are compatible with subjective expected utility
and Bayesian updating, while forming the basis of backward induction and dynamic
programming. We examine the connection between these properties in a general en-
vironment of convex preferences over monetary acts and find that, far from being
incompatible, they are connected in an economically meaningful way. In single-agent
decision problems, positive value of information characterises one direction of DC. We
propose a weakening of DC and show that one direction is equivalent to weakly valuable
information, whereas the other characterises the Bayesian updating of the subjective
beliefs which are revealed by trading behavior. In financial markets, we characterize
no speculative trade, without requiring any form of Consequentialism, and show that
there is weakly negative value of public information in risk-sharing environments with
no aggregate uncertainty.
JEL-Classifications: D81, D83, D91
Keywords: Updating, Ambiguity, Dynamic Consistency, Bayesian, Consequen-
tialism, Value of Information, No Trade, Speculative Trade.
1 Introduction
In dynamic-choice problems under uncertainty, the decision maker updates his prefer-
ences and his beliefs as new information arrives, taking optimal actions in each period.
Two are the most widely used constraints on how these preferences are updated. The
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first, Dynamic Consistency (DC), requires that an action plan is optimal when eval-
uated with the updated preferences of a later period if and only if it is optimal when
evaluated with the preferences of an earlier period. DC ensures that an ex ante optimal
action plan will remain optimal at every period and irrespective of how information is
updated. The second, Consequentialism, requires that conditional preferences do not
depend on past actions, foregone payoffs or unrealized events. These two properties
form the basis of backward induction and dynamic programming.
The Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) model is consistent with both DC and
Consequentialism, together with other attractive properties, such as positive value of
information, recursive representation of preferences and Bayesian updating of beliefs.
However, for other preferences this is not true in general. In particular, preferences
which are ambiguity sensitive must either relax DC or Consequentialism (Siniscalchi
[2009]).
The purpose of this paper is to examine the connection between these properties
in a general environment of convex preferences over monetary acts. We find that, far
from being incompatible, they are connected in an economically meaningful way. We
break DC into two parts. Consider two acts f and g which specify the same monetary
payoffs if event E occurs. The “if” direction of DC specifies that if the agent weakly
prefers f over g ex ante, then he also prefers it when he learns that E did not occur.
The “only if” direction specifies the converse.
We first show that the “only if” direction of DC is inconsistent with Ellsberg [1961]
but equivalent to positive value of information, meaning that a single agent always
prefers to receive more information to less. Intuitively, an agent who understands
that his preferences will change if he learns an event might not want to receive this
information, as this could lead to choices that he considers suboptimal in the ex ante
stage. Although several authors have previously discussed this connection, to our
knowledge this is the first paper that provides a formal characterization.
Al-Najjar and Weinstein [2009] have criticised the ambiguity aversion literature
on the basis that aversion to information is not normatively appealing. However,
we show that ambiguity averse preferences are consistent with a weaker version of
valuable information. In particular, we say that information is weakly valuable if (ex
ante) the agent always prefers mixing more information with less information, rather
than receiving less information with certainty. Such an agent recognises that more
information has at least some value, even if he does not think that more information
with certainty is optimal. We then characterize weakly valuable information with
respect to a weakening of the “only if” direction of DC. These results on the value of
information do not require the full strength of Consequentialism (although they are
still true when Consequentialism is assumed). In particular, we use a weaker axiom,
Status Quo Bias. This property was first proposed in axiomatic work by Masatlioglu
and Ok [2005], however it has been studied experimentally at least since Samuelson
and Zeckhauser [1988], who provided evidence in a study concerning portfolio choices.
Second, we show that a weakening of the “if” direction of DC characterizes the
Bayesian updating of the beliefs revealed by potential trading behavior (and are not
necessarily part of the utility representation of preferences). They are called “subjective
beliefs” by Rigotti et al. [2008] (RSS), who identify them for a wide variety of models
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with convex preferences over monetary acts, hence making our approach very general.
Subjective beliefs have economic content in static environments, as RSS show that
they characterize efficient and full insurance allocations. Moreover, each subjective
belief can be interpreted as state prices of Arrow-Debreu securities, for which the agent
is not willing to trade the act f with which he is endowed.1 If these prices prevail in
the market, we say that f is revealed preferred to all the acts that are affordable for the
agent. Our proposed weakening of the “if” direction of DC specifies that if f is ex ante
revealed preferred (but not necessarily weakly preferred) to another act g then f is ex
post weakly preferred to g. The weakening of the “only if” direction of DC specifies
that if f is ex post weakly preferred to g, then it cannot be that g is ex ante revealed
preferred (but could be strictly preferred) to f .2
We show that the economic content of subjective beliefs extends to dynamic and
multi-agent environments, as their Bayesian updating is the minimum requirement
which ensures that there is no speculative trade.3 The absence of speculative trade is
the familiar result of Milgrom and Stokey [1982], that starting from an ex ante efficient
allocation, it cannot be common knowledge in the interim stage that there is another
allocation which Pareto dominates it. Interestingly, the result does not require any
form of Consequentialism, unlike other papers in the literature.
We also examine the value of information in a competitive risk-sharing environment
without aggregate uncertainty, where agents trade state-contingent claims. In the SEU
model with risk aversion, it is shown with an example by Hirshleifer [1971] and more
generally by Schlee [2001] that public information makes everyone weakly worse off, as
it destroys opportunities for mutual insurance. We generalize this result by showing
that under the“if” direction of weak DC and Status Quo Bias, if information is (weakly)
valuable for each agent, then public information is (weakly) not valuable.
Using the results of RSS, who characterise the subjective beliefs for several ambigu-
ity averse preference models, we discuss some updating rules. We note that our domain
of preferences, just like in RSS, is acts from states to monetary outcomes, a special case
of Savage [1954]. This is the natural domain in order to interpret subjective beliefs as
prices of Arrow-Debreu securities, motivate the weakening of DC using the notion of
revealed preference and provide the applications on speculative trade and risk-sharing.
However, many decision theoretic models use the more general domain of acts from
states to lotteries over outcomes. We discuss in Section 8 how weak DC extends to
this domain.
1.1 Our approach
We illustrate our approach by analyzing a dynamic Ellsberg’s three-color problem,
taken from Epstein and Schneider [2003] and Hanany and Klibanoff [2007]. We show
1An act can be identified by a convex combination of Arrow-Debreu securities, thus providing a mapping
from states to consumption of a single good.
2As with DC, the axiom applies only for acts f and g which are identical outside of the event that is
revealed ex post. Formal details are presented in Section 2.
3It is minimum in the sense that if at least one agent violates it, there are economies where there is
speculative trade, whereas if everyone satisfies it there cannot be speculative trade.
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that Ellsberg preferences, Consequentialism and an axiom we call Conditional Pref-
erence imply that DC and value of information are violated. We then explain our
weakening of DC.
An urn contains 120 balls, 40 of which are known to be black (B), whereas the
remaining 80 are somehow divided between red (R) and yellow (Y). The state space is
S = {B,R, Y }. A bet is an act from S to R, specifying a payoff at each state.
Consider acts f1 = (1, 0, 0), f2 = (0, 1, 0), f3 = (0, 1, 1) and f4 = (1, 0, 1), where,
for example, f1 specifies a payoff of 1 if the state is B and 0 otherwise. The agent has
ex ante preferences % which conform to Ellsberg, hence f1  f2 and f3  f4.
We assume that the agent is endowed with preference relation %{B,R} conditional
on learning that event {B,R} has occurred and %{Y } conditional on learning that event
{Y } has occurred. This specification implicitly assumes Consequentialism, because the
conditional preference only depends on the updated event and not on other parameters,
such as the act that the agent chose in the previous period or the decision problem he
faced.
Note that, conditional on {Y }, f1 is identical to f2 and f3 is identical to f4. The
axiom Conditional Preference requires that the agent is indifferent between such acts if
he learns that {Y } has occurred, hence f1 ∼{Y } f2 and f3 ∼{Y } f4.4 Similarly, because
conditional on {B,R} f1 is identical with f4 and f2 is identical with f3, Conditional
Preference requires that f1 ∼{B,R} f4 and f2 ∼{B,R} f3.
We first show that these Ellsberg preferences imply that DC is violated and informa-
tion is not valuable. We represent information by a partition Π of S. Let A = {f1, f2}
be the set of feasible acts. Without loss of generality, suppose that f2 %{B,R} f1.5
First, suppose that the agent has no information, so his partition is Π1 = {S}. In
other words, he never learns whether {Y } has occurred or not, so %{Y } and %{B,R} are
irrelevant. Then, he chooses f1, because f1  f2.
Consider now the more informative partition Π2 = {{B,R}, Y }, meaning that he
is informed whether Y has occurred or not, before making his choice. If he learns that
{B,R} has occurred, he chooses f2 because f2 %{B,R} f1, whereas if he learns {Y }, he
again chooses f2 because f1 ∼{Y } f2.
The agent understands that if his partition is Π1 he will get f1 in all states, whereas
if his partition is Π2 he will get f2. He strictly prefers partition Π1 to partition Π2
ex ante because f1  f2. Because Π2 is finer than Π1, information is not valuable.
The “only if” direction of DC (Axiom 13) specifies that if the agent weakly prefers
f2 over f1 given that he has learned {B,R} and the acts are identical outside of
{B,R}, then he also weakly prefers f2 over f1 before learning whether {B,R} has
occurred or not. This is violated here as we have both f2 %{B,R} f1 and f1  f2.
Violation of both Axiom 13 and valuable information is not particular to this example,
as Proposition 1 shows that they are equivalent. In a risk-sharing environment with no
aggregate uncertainty, Proposition 4 shows that if each agent values more information,
4Several authors call this property Consequentialism, implicitly assuming that the conditional preference
only depends on the realised event. Following Epstein and Schneider [2003], we call this property Conditional
Preference and formally define it in Section 2 as Axiom 5. We assume it throughout the paper.
5For the case where f1 %{B,R} f2, we can obtain negative value of information using a similar example,
with feasible acts A = {f3, f4}, as Consequentialism implies that f3 %{B,R} f4.
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Figure 1: Revealed preference
then public information makes everyone weakly worse off, generalising the results of
Hirshleifer [1971] and Schlee [2001].
The above results show that we cannot weaken the “only if” part of DC without
losing positive value of information. Suppose now that af2 + (1 − a)f1 % f1 for some
a ∈ (0, 1]. Then, the agent recognises that more information has some value, because
he would prefer to mix more with less information, instead of getting less information
for sure.6 When this happens, we say that information is weakly valuable. Proposition
1 characterizes this form of valuable information in terms of Axiom 15, which is weaker
than Axiom 13, the “only if” part of DC.
We weaken DC by introducing the revealed preference relation, denoted %∗. We say
that f is revealed preferred to g if f is weakly preferred to all mixtures af + (1− a)g,
for a ∈ [0, 1]. This is an incomplete but transitive relation. In Figure 1, there are two
states, s1 and s2 and a point denotes an act. The depicted indifference curve has a
kink at f and several supporting hyperplanes, given by the shaded area. Although f is
strictly preferred to g, h and k, it is revealed preferred only to g and h. Even though f is
not revealed preferred to k, convexity of preferences implies that f is strictly preferred
to some convex combination of f and k. This convexity property is used extensively.
The normals of the hyperplanes that pass from f (normalized to be probability
distributions) are called subjective beliefs at f by Rigotti et al. [2008] and denoted
by pi(f). For convex preferences, each p ∈ pi(f) has the following property: if the
expectation of f given p (denoted Epf) is greater or equal to the expectation of another
act g given p, then f is weakly preferred to g. We can interpret p as a price vector,
such that p(s) is the price of the Arrow-Debreu security that pays 1 if state s occurs
6The interpretation of mixing depends on the range of acts. If the range is monetary outcomes (or more
generally a convex set, a special case of Savage [1954]), then af2+(1−a)f1 provides, at state s, the monetary
outcome af2(s)+(1−a)f1(s). If acts are contingent lotteries, a special case of Anscombe and Aumann [1963],
then af2(s) + (1 − a)f1(s) is a lottery that gives f2(s) with probability a and f1(s) with probability 1 − a.
In the paper the range is monetary outcomes, but we discuss the extension to state contingent lotteries in
Section 8.
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and 0 otherwise. Then, the property says that if the agent’s endowment is f , he would
have zero net demand at each price vector p ∈ pi(f). Hence, we say that f is revealed
preferred to g because the agent could afford g given prices p but chose his endowment,
f .
Suppose that acts f and g are identical in terms of what they prescribe if event
E does not occur. Then, the “if” part of DC is weakened by requiring that if f is
revealed preferred (but not necessarily weakly preferred) to g ex ante, then f is weakly
preferred to g conditional on E. The “only if” part of DC is weakened by requiring
that if f is weakly preferred to g conditional on E, then g cannot be revealed preferred
(but could be strictly preferred) to f ex ante.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model, whereas Section 3
formalises the notions of (weak) valuable information and characterizes them with
respect to the “only if” part of (weak) DC. In Section 4, we characterize the “if” part
of weak DC with respect to Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs. We discuss various
updating rules in Section 5. In Section 6, we show that Bayesian updating of subjective
beliefs is the minimum requirement that precludes speculative trade. In Section 7, we
show that if each agent individually considers information to be (weakly) valuable, then
public information is not (weakly) valuable in competitive risk-sharing environments
with no aggregate uncertainty. In Section 8, we discuss the related literature and
provide a detailed comparison with Ghirardato et al. [2004] and Hanany and Klibanoff
[2007, 2009], which are more closely related with our approach. All proofs are contained
in the Appendix.
2 Model
2.1 Preliminaries
Fix a finite set of payoff relevant states S, with typical element s. The set of conse-
quences is R+, interpreted as monetary payoffs. Let F = RS+ be the set of acts, with
the natural topology. An act f ∈ F maps each state s to a monetary payoff. Given
x ∈ R+, let x ∈ F be the constant act with payoff x at each state s. Let X be the set
of constant acts. An act f is strictly positive if f(s) > 0 for all s ∈ S. Let F+ be the
set of strictly positive acts.
For any two acts f, g ∈ F and event E ⊆ S, we denote by fEg the act h such that
h(s) = f(s) if s ∈ E and h(s) = g(s) if s /∈ E. Define f ≥E g if f(s) ≥ g(s) for all
s ∈ E, with strict inequality for some s ∈ E. Equality f =E g and strict inequality are
similarly defined. Let Ec be the complement of E with respect to S.
Given events E,F ⊆ S and probability measure p ∈ ∆E, where F ⊆ E and
p(F ) > 0, denote by pF ∈ ∆F the measure obtained through Bayesian conditioning of
p on F . Formally, for any event G ⊆ S, pF (G) = p(G∩F )p(F ) . We write Epf :=
∑
s∈E
p(s)f(s)
for the expectation of f given p.
Let E be a collection of nonempty events E ⊆ S which contains S. The decision
maker is endowed with a collection of conditional preference relations, {%E,h}E∈E,h∈F ,
one for each event E ∈ E and each act h ∈ F . The interpretation is that in a previous
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period the agent had chosen act h and in the current period he learns that event E
has occurred. His updated preference relation is then %E,h. The ex ante preference
relation %S,h does not depend on the act h and is denoted by %.
A partition Π of S is a collection of mutually disjoint events, whose union is S. It
is finer than another partition Π′ if, for each E′ ∈ Π′, there exists E ∈ Π with E ⊆ E′.
We then say that Π′ is coarser than Π.
2.2 Revealed preference
Given preference relation %E,h, we say that act f is revealed preferred to act g, written
f %∗E,h g, if f %E,h ag + (1 − a)f for all a ∈ [0, 1], so that f is weakly preferred
to all convex combinations of f and g. Preference relation %∗E,h is transitive but not
necessarily complete.
The interpretation of f %∗E,h g is that f is weakly preferred to g under %E,h and g
is inside a “budget set”, which is constructed given f as the agent’s endowment and
some prices for the Arrow-Debreu securities, one for each state. If these prices were
to prevail and the agent chose f , it would be revealed that the agent prefers f over
g. Consider Figure 1. The indifference curve has a kink on act f and the two straight
lines which define the shaded area are some of its supporting hyperplanes. Each such
line defines a budget set, where f is affordable. Any act that is within this budget
set, like g, is affordable but f is weakly preferred to g, hence we say that f is revealed
preferred to g. On the contrary, although f is strictly preferred to k, it is not revealed
preferred to it, because it is outside any of these budget sets.
2.3 Convex preferences
We consider the following axioms on preferences {%E,h}E∈E,h∈F , for all events E ∈ E
and acts h ∈ F .
Axiom 1. (Preference). %E,h is complete and transitive.
Axiom 2. (Continuity). For all f ∈ F , the sets {g ∈ F : g %E,h f} and {g ∈ F :
f %E,h g} are closed.
Axiom 3. (Monotonicity). For all f, g ∈ F , if f >E g then f E,h g.
Axiom 4. (Convexity). For all f ∈ F , the set {g ∈ F|g %E,h f} is convex.
These four axioms are standard and imply that each %E,h is represented by a
continuous, increasing and quasiconcave function UE,h : F → R. The next axiom,
which we require throughout the paper, specifies that if the agent knows that event E
has occurred, his preferences depend only on what acts specify inside E.
Axiom 5. (Conditional Preference) For all f, g ∈ F , if f =E g then f ∼E,h g.
We say that preferences {%E}E∈E,h∈F are convex if they satisfy Axioms 1 through
5. For our results on speculative trade, we use the strong versions of Monotonicity and
Convexity.
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Axiom 6. (Strong Monotonicity). For all f 6=E g, if f ≥E g, then f E,h g.
Axiom 7. (Strict Convexity). For all f 6=E g and α ∈ (0, 1), if f %E,h g, then
αf + (1− α)g E,h g.
The following axiom, No Flat Kinks, is weaker than Strict Convexity and specifies
that if g is strictly preferred to f , then it is not the case that g is indifferent to all
convex combinations of f and g for a closed interval of weights. We use this axiom in
order to show the equivalence of weakly valuable information and one direction of weak
DC. It allows for straight indifference curves but not those that have a “flat” kink.
Axiom 8. (No Flat Kinks) If g E,h f then there does not exist a ∈ (0, 1] such that
af + (1− a)g ∼E,h g for all a ∈ [0, a].
An event F ⊆ E is non%E,h-null if g(s) > g′(s) for all s ∈ F implies gFf E,h g′Ff ,
for all acts g, g′, f . Hanany and Klibanoff [2007, 2009] restrict attention to non-null
events.7 However, we impose a weaker definition of non-nullity, which is motivated by
the property that all subjective beliefs assign positive probability to not weakly null
events, as we show in Lemma 2. Event F is weakly %E,h-null if there exists act g such
that, for all acts g′, f , gFf %E,h g′Ff . Because for every act f there exists another
act g such that g(s) > f(s) for all s ∈ F , we have that if F is non-null then it is also
not weakly null. The following axiom requires that all events in E are not weakly null.
Axiom 9. (Weak Full Support). For all events E,F ∈ E, where F ⊆ E, F is not
weakly %E,h-null.
2.4 Consequentialism
Consequentialism requires that the agent’s preferences depend only on the received
information and not on the act that was chosen in the previous period.8
Axiom 10. (Consequentialism) For all f, g ∈ F and events E ∈ E, %E,f=%E,g.
A weakening of Axiom 10 has been proposed in axiomatic work by Masatlioglu and
Ok [2005], Sagi [2006] and Ortoleva [2010], where preference relation %E,h depends on
a “status quo” act (or frame) h. It specifies that if the agent ever prefers f over g
(given some status quo h), then he would also prefer it if the status quo was f . In
other words, the status quo exerts attraction towards itself.
Axiom 11. (Status Quo Bias) For all f, g, h ∈ F and events E ∈ E, if f %E,h g then
f %E,f g.
As pointed by Masatlioglu and Ok [2005], Status Quo Bias is documented not only
by experimental studies but also by empirical work in actual markets. For instance,
Madrian and Shea [2001] examined how the default choice influenced participation in
401(k) saving plans, whereas Samuelson and Zeckhauser [1988] identified Status Quo
Bias experimentally, in a study concerning portfolio choices.
7In their setting, F is non %E,h-null if g(s) E,h g′(s) for all s ∈ F implies gFf E,h g′Ff , for all acts
g, g′, f .
8Some papers refer to Consequentialism as the conjunction of Axioms 5 and 10.
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2.5 Dynamic Consistency
DC provides restrictions on how two acts, which are identical outside of the conditioning
event E, should be compared before and after E is known to have occurred. We break
DC into two Axioms and adopt the names proposed by Ghirardato [2002].
Axiom 12. (Consistency of Implementation) For all acts f, g ∈ F and events E ∈ E,
if f % g and f =Ec g then f %E,f g.
Suppose that f and g specify the same payoff at each state not belonging to event
E and that f is weakly preferred to g ex ante. Consistency of Implementation says
that if the agent has chosen f ex ante and he is informed that event E has occurred
(so that his preferences are %E,f ), then in the interim stage f is still weakly preferred
to g.
Axiom 13. (Information is Valuable) For all acts f, g ∈ F and events E ∈ E, if
f %E,f g and f =Ec g then f % g.
It is easier to interpret this axiom if we state the contrapositive, so that g  f and
f =Ec g imply g E,f f . Suppose that f and g specify the same payoff at each state
not belonging to event E and that g is ex ante strictly preferred to f . Information is
Valuable specifies that if the agent chose f ex ante and he is informed that event E has
occurred (so that his preferences are %E,f ), then, in the interim stage, g is still strictly
preferred to f . But if g is ex ante strictly preferred to f , why should we put restrictions
on the agent’s preferences given that he has chosen f? The reason is that it may be
that g was not feasible in the ex ante stage when f was chosen, hence his relevant
conditional preferences are %E,f . Moreover, it could be that g becomes feasible in the
interim stage.
2.6 Weak Dynamic Consistency
Using our notion of revealed preference, we provide a weakening of DC. Axiom 12
(Consistency of Implementation) is weakened by requiring that if ex ante f is revealed
preferred (but not necessarily weakly preferred) to g, then f is weakly preferred to g,
conditional on E. We also require that f is a strictly positive act.
Axiom 14. (Weak Consistency of Implementation) For all acts f ∈ F+, g ∈ F and
events E ∈ E, if f %∗ g and f =Ec g then f %E,f g.
Suppose that there are three states {s1, s2, s3}, the graph in Figure 1 depicts acts
that are identical given s3 but the indifference curve represents the ex ante preference
relation %, where S = {s1, s2, s3}.9 Act f is strictly preferred to g, h and k according
to % but it is revealed preferred only to g and h. Hence, Axiom 14 requires that, given
E = {s1, s2}, f is weakly preferred to g and h but not k. Proposition 2 shows that
Axiom 14 characterizes Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs.
The other direction of DC, Axiom 13 (Information is Valuable), is weakened in a
similar manner. Axiom 15 requires that if f is weakly preferred to g conditional on E
and f but ex ante strictly preferred to f , then g is not revealed preferred to f .
9Axiom 14 has content if there are at least three states.
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Axiom 15. (Weak Information is Valuable) For all acts f ∈ F , g ∈ F+ and events
E ∈ E, if f %E,f g, f =Ec g and g  f then g 6%∗ f .
To interpret this Axiom using the contrapositive, as with the stronger Axiom 13,
suppose that f and g specify the same payoff at each state not belonging to event E and
that g is ex ante both revealed preferred and strictly preferred to f . Weak Information
is Valuable specifies that if the agent has chosen f ex ante and he is informed that
event E has occurred (so that his preferences are %E,f ), then, in the interim stage, g
is still strictly preferred to f . Why impose restrictions on the agent’s preferences given
f , when g was strictly preferred ex ante? As with the justification of Axiom 13, this
Axiom makes sense in the case where g was not feasible ex ante, so that the agent
chose f and his preferences in the interim are %E,f .
In the previous example, if k %E,k f and k =Ec f , then Axiom 15 requires that
f 6%∗ k, so that k lies strictly above the shaded area. This means that Axiom 15 allows
for f  k, as is shown in Figure 1, unlike Axiom 13 which requires that k % f and
therefore is stronger for convex preferences. Proposition 1 shows that Axiom 15 is
equivalent to weakly valuable information.
What is the connection between the two parts of DC and weak DC? Under Strict
Convexity and Status Quo Bias, (Weak) Information is Valuable implies (Weak) Con-
sistency of Implementation. If we strengthen Status Quo Bias to Consequentialism,
then the converse is also true.
Lemma 1. Suppose convex preferences {%E,h}E∈E,h∈F satisfy Axiom 7. Under Axiom
11, Axiom 13 (Axiom 15) implies Axiom 12 (Axiom 14). Under Axiom 10, the converse
is also true.
3 Valuable information
Several papers show with examples that failure of DC implies that information is not
always valuable, under various settings (e.g. Wakker [1988], Epstein and Le Breton
[1993]). In this section, we provide a formal treatment of this result and show that the
converse is also true. In particular, we define information to be valuable if an agent
always ex ante prefers having a finer than a coarser partition, given that he will choose
an action in the interim stage, when a partition cell is revealed to him. We show that
valuable information characterises the second part of DC (Axiom 13).10
However, even if the agent does not think that more information is always valuable,
he may still recognise that it has some value. If the agent prefers mixing, for some
a ∈ (0, 1], between receiving the finer and the coarser partition, over receiving the
coarser partition with certainty, we say that information is weakly valuable and show
that it characterizes Axiom 15, which is the second part of weak DC.
In order to define (weakly) valuable information, we adopt the framework of Geanako-
plos [1989], which assumed expected utility, to the present setting. There are two peri-
ods, 0 and 1. For simplicity, initially assume Axiom 10 (Consequentialism). An agent
faces some uncertainty in period 0, represented by ex ante preferences % and a finite
10We are not aware of such a characterization previously shown in the literature.
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state space S. His decision problem consists of a feasible set of acts, A, and a partition
Π = {E1, . . . , En} of S. The agent expects that, in period 1, he will be informed that
a particular cell E ∈ Π of his partition has occurred and will choose an “interim” act
fE ∈ A, which is optimal according to his conditional preferences %E . By choosing
an optimal interim act fE for each partition cell E ∈ Π, he can generate an “ex-ante”
optimal act h such that h =E fE , for each E ∈ Π. In other words, the ex ante optimal
act h agrees with the interim acts fE1 , . . . fEn , conditional on each element of Π, and
fE %E g for all g ∈ A.
Since we want to characterise valuable information also in the case where Con-
sequentialism is not assumed, we adjust slightly the definition of ex ante optimality.
In particular, we say that the ex ante optimal act h agrees with the interim acts
fE1 , . . . fEn , conditional on each element of Π, and fE %E,h g for all g ∈ A.
The ex ante optimal act may not be unique, because there may be many interim
optimal acts fE , f
′
E ∈ A given E. We therefore require, in order to say that partition
Π is “more valuable” than partition Π′ given A, that for every ex ante optimal act hΠ′
for Π′ there is an ex ante optimal act hΠ for Π such that hΠ % hΠ′ . It is weakly more
valuable if ahΠ + (1− a)hΠ′ % hΠ′ , for some a ∈ (0, 1]. We then say that information
is (weakly) valuable if, for all A, whenever Π is finer than Π′ it is also (weakly) more
valuable.
We now provide the formal treatment. Fix a collection of conditional preference
relations {%E,h}E∈E,h∈F , where % is the preference relation in period 0. A decision
problem D = {Π,A} consists of a partition Π ⊆ E of S representing the information
in period 1 and a set of available acts A ⊆ F .
An act f ∈ F is feasible ex ante for decision problem D if for each E ∈ Π there
exists g ∈ A such that f =E g, so that they provide the same payoffs given event E.
Let FD be the set of acts which are feasible ex ante with respect to decision problem
D. Note that A ⊆ FD, whereas if Π = {S} is the trivial partition, then A = FD. An
act f ∈ FD which is feasible ex ante is optimal if, conditional on each element E ∈ Π
of the partition and f , it is weakly preferred to any act g ∈ A.
Definition 1. Act f ∈ FD is optimal for decision problem D = {Π,A} if for all E ∈ Π,
f %E,f g for all g ∈ A.
Note that even if optimal f ∈ FD does not belong to A, Axiom 5 and ex ante
feasibility of f imply that there exists g ∈ A with f =E g and f ∼E,f g, hence it is as if
the agent picks f at each cell E. We compare two decision problems that differ only in
terms of how they partition S, by comparing the optimal acts they generate, according
to the ex ante preference relation %. Decision problem D1 is more valuable than D2 if,
for every optimal act for D2 there exists an optimal act for D1 that the agent weakly
prefers. It is weakly more valuable if he weakly prefers a convex combination of the
two.
Definition 2. Decision problem D1 = {Π1,A} is more valuable than decision problem
D2 = {Π2,A} if, whenever act f ∈ FD1 is optimal for D1 and act g ∈ FD2 is optimal
for D2, we have f % g. It is weakly more valuable if af + (1 − a)g % g for some
a ∈ (0, 1].
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Recall that partition Π1 is finer than partition Π2 if for every element E2 ∈ Π2, there
exists E1 ∈ Π1 with E1 ⊆ E2. Information is (weakly) valuable for {%E,h}E∈E,h∈F if a
decision problem generated by a finer partition is always (weakly) more valuable.11
Definition 3. Information is (weakly) valuable for {%E,h}E∈E,h∈F if for all A ⊆ F
(F+), whenever partition Π1 is finer than partition Π2, decision problem D1 = {Π1,A}
is (weakly) more valuable than decision problem D2 = {Π2,A}.
We now show that valuable information is equivalent to Axiom 13, whereas under
Axiom 8 weakly valuable information is equivalent to Axiom 15. Interestingly, we do
not need to assume Consequentialism but Status Quo Bias, which is weaker.
Proposition 1. Suppose Axiom 11 is satisfied. Then, information is valuable for
convex preferences {%E,h}E∈E,h∈F if and only if Axiom 13 is satisfied. Axiom 15
implies that information is weakly valuable. Conversely, under Axiom 8 weakly valuable
information implies Axiom 15.
4 Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs
RSS define the subjective beliefs at an act f and preference relation %E,h to be the set
of all normals (normalized to be probabilities) of the supporting hyperplanes of f ,
piE,h(f) = {p ∈ ∆S : Epg ≥ Epf for all g %E,h f}.
In Figure 1, the indifference curve at f has a kink. All the supporting hyperplanes at
f are in the shaded area. Set piE,h(f) contains their (normalized) normals.
RSS provide two alternative definitions for subjective beliefs and show that all three
coincide for strictly positive acts. First, suppose that the agent’s endowment is act f
and we interpret a probability measure as a set of prices, one for each Arrow-Debreu
security which pays 1 in a particular state and 0 otherwise. Given preference relation
%E,h, the subjective beliefs revealed by unwillingness to trade at f contain the measures
(prices) for which the agent would be unwilling to trade his endowment,
piuE,h(f) = {p ∈ ∆S : f %E,h g for all g such that Epg = Epf}.
Second, let P be a set of measures (prices) such that whenever another act k is
unaffordable for every p ∈ P , then there exists a mixture of k with endowment f
that the agent would strictly prefer to his endowment. In Figure 1, there exist some
points on the convex combination between f and k that are strictly preferred to f .
The smallest such P of measures contains the subjective beliefs revealed by willingness
to trade at f . Formally, let PE,h(f) denote the collection of all compact, convex sets
P ⊆ ∆S such that if Epg > Epf for all p ∈ P , then g+ (1− )f E,h f for sufficiently
small  > 0. Then, the subjective beliefs revealed by willingness to trade at f are
11The definition of weakly valuable information is restricted to feasible sets A ⊆ F+ consisting of strictly
positive acts. This simplifies the analysis (as in Hanany and Klibanoff [2009]), because it avoids the multi-
plicity of supporting hyperplanes at the boundary.
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denoted by piwE,h(f) =
⋂PE,h(f). RSS show that for strictly positive acts f , piE,h(f) =
piuE,h(f) = pi
w
E,h(f).
We next define Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs. Note that even though we
require that every subjective belief in pi(f) is updated when E occurs, we allow for the
possibility that more subjective beliefs are included given E.
Definition 4. The subjective beliefs of {%E,h}E∈E,h∈F are updated using Bayes’ rule
if, for all E ∈ E and all f ∈ F+, if p ∈ pi(f) and p(E) > 0 then pE ∈ piE,f (f).
A convenient and often assumed property of dynamic models with ambiguity is
mutual absolute continuity of the priors used to represent preferences. It says that
all priors put positive probability on the same events. This facilitates the Bayesian
updating of all the priors when new information arrives, without worrying how to
update priors that assign zero probability on the event. Epstein and Marinacci [2007]
characterize mutual absolute continuity in the multiple priors model, using a condition
introduced by Kreps [1979]. In the following lemma we characterize mutual absolute
continuity of the subjective beliefs, using the notion of a weakly null event.
Lemma 2. If event F ⊆ E ∈ E is not weakly %E,h-null then p ∈ piuE,h(f) implies
p(F ) > 0, for all acts f ∈ F . Conversely, if, for all acts f ∈ F , p ∈ piwE,h(f) implies
p(F ) > 0, then F is not weakly %E,h-null.
Using this lemma, Axiom 9 (which is implied by Strong Monotonicity) ensures that
all subjective beliefs p ∈ piuE,h(f) put positive probability at each event F ∈ E , where
F ⊆ E.
We now show that Axiom 14 (Weak Consistency of Implementation), which is
weaker than the second part of DC (Axiom 12), is equivalent to Bayesian updating
of subjective beliefs. For the “only if” direction we also need Axiom 9, which ensures
that all subjective beliefs put positive probability on each conditioning event.
Proposition 2. Suppose that convex preferences {%E,h}E∈E,h∈F satisfy Axiom 9.
Then, subjective beliefs are updated using Bayes’ rule if and only if Axiom 14 is satis-
fied.
5 Updating rules
In this section we discuss updating rules using the results of RSS, who characterise the
subjective beliefs for various preference models with ambiguity aversion. We propose
rules which satisfy Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs and therefore Axiom 14.
As with the rest of the paper and RSS, the domain of preferences is acts from states
to monetary outcomes. In Section 8, we discuss how Axiom 14 can be extended to
a domain of state contingent lotteries. We restrict attention to strictly positive acts
f , so that pih(f) = pi
u
h(f) = pi
w
h (f). We also assume that whenever u is defined, it is
concave, increasing and continuously differentiable.
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5.1 Variational preferences
Maccheroni et al. [2006a] axiomatize the variational preferences model, which con-
tains as special cases the MEU model of Gilboa and Schmeidler [1989], the multiplier
preferences model of Hansen and Sargent [2001] and the mean-variance preferences of
Markowitz [1952] and Tobin [1958]. The representation of ex ante preferences is
U(f) = min
p∈∆S
{∫
u(f)dp+ c(p)
}
,
where c : ∆S → [0,∞] is a lower semicontinuous convex function, called ambiguity
index, with min
p∈∆S
c(p) = 0 and u is increasing, concave and differentiable. For simplicity,
we assume that if c(p) 6= +∞, then p(E) > 0 for all E ∈ E . RSS show that such
preferences are convex.
Given event E ∈ E , act h ∈ F and preference relation %E,h, the agent’s utility at f
is UE,h(f) = min
p∈∆E
{∫
u(f)dp+ cE,h(p)
}
, where cE,h is the conditional ambiguity index
with min
p∈∆E
cE,h(p) = 0. Let ME,h(f) = argmin
p∈∆E
{∫
u(f)dp+ cE,h(p)
}
be the normals
of the supporting hyperplanes at UE,h(f).
We define an updating rule by a tuple {Df , nE,f , kE,f , cE,f}, for each event E ∈ E
and act f . First, Df ⊆ ∆S is a convex set such that M(f) ⊆ Df .12 Let DfE be the
prior by prior updating of Df . Second, function nE,f : D
f
E → ∆S maps each p ∈ DfE
to an unconditional q ∈ ∆S. Third, let
kE,f = min
q∈DfE
{∫
u(f)dnE,f (q) + c(nE,f (q))−
∫
u(f)dq
}
.
The ambiguity index cE,f : ∆E → [0,+∞] is defined as
cE,f (p) =
∫
u(f)dnE,f (p) + c(nE,f (p))−
∫
u(f)dp− kE,f , (1)
if p ∈ DfE , otherwise cE,f (p) = +∞. Subtracting kE,f ensures that cE,f (p) ∈ [0,+∞]
and cE,f (p) = 0 for some p. In order to ensure that cE,f is convex, continuous and
subjective beliefs are updated, we consider two specific functions nE,f .
For the first updating rule, fix measure r ∈ M(f) with r(E) > 0 and let Df such
that p ∈ Df implies c(p) 6= +∞.13 Set nE,f (p) = r for all p ∈ DfE .
The second rule applies only in the case where M(f) = {r} is a singleton and
r(E) > 0. Set Df = ∆S and let nE,f (p) = p⊗E r for all p ∈ ∆E, where p⊗E r ∈ ∆S is
such that p⊗E r(F ) = r(E)p(F )+r(F ∩Ec) for all events F . Then, in p⊗E r the choice
of p determines all probabilities given E whereas r determines all other probabilities.
We next show that these two rules generate variational preferences that satisfy
Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs and Axiom 14, although Axioms 12 and 13 are
12Note that M(f) is convex.
13Note that if there does not exist r ∈ M(h) with r(E) > 0, Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs is
trivially satisfied.
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violated in general. Interestingly, for the first rule, if we set Df = D to be the set of
all measures with c(p) 6= +∞, for all f ∈ F , so that it is independent of f , then Axiom
12 is satisfied. If Df = M(f) for all f ∈ F , then Axiom 13 is satisfied. Hence, the
largest possible set of prior by prior updating satisfies Consistency of Implementation,
whereas the smallest possible set satisfies Information is Valuable. Any set which is in
between, satisfies Weak Consistency of Implementation.
Lemma 3. Suppose that % is a variational preference. Then, both updating rules
described above generate variational preferences {%E,f}E∈E,f∈F that satisfy Bayesian
updating of subjective beliefs and Axiom 14. Moreover, in the first rule if Df = D for
all f ∈ F and c(p) 6= +∞ implies p ∈ D, then Axiom 12 is satisfied. If Df = M(f) for
all f ∈ F , then Axiom 13 is satisfied. However, in general both rules violate Axioms
12 and 13.
5.2 Confidence preferences
Chateauneuf and Faro [2009] axiomatize a class of preferences where ambiguity is mea-
sured by a confidence function φ : ∆S → [0, 1], with φ(p) = 1 meaning full confidence
in p. The set of full confidence measures is nonempty and φ is upper semicontinuous
and quasiconcave. Preferences are represented by
U(f) = min
p∈La
1
φ(p)
Epu(f),
where La = {q ∈ ∆S : φ(q) ≥ a} is a set of measures with confidence of at least a > 0.
Define M(f) = arg min
p∈La
{
1
φ(p)Epu(f)
}
for each f ∈ F . For simplicity, we assume that
if p ∈ La then p(E) > 0 for all E ∈ E . Hence, Axiom 9 is satisfied.
Consider the following updating rule. Fix measure r ∈ M(h) with r(E) > 0 and
convex set Dh such that M(h) ⊆ Dh ⊆ La. Let DhE be the prior by prior updating of
Dh, given E ∈ E . Let kE,h = max
q∈DE
φ(r)
Equ(h)
Eru(h) . For each p ∈ ∆E, define
φE,h(p) =
φ(r)
kE,h
Epu(h)
Eru(h)
(2)
if p ∈ DE , otherwise φE,h(p) = 0. Setting aE,h = min
p∈DE
φE,h(p), we have that D
h
E =
LaE,h and UE,h(f) = min
p∈LaE,h
1
φE,h(p)
Epu(f).
We now show that this updating rule satisfies Axiom 14. As with the first updating
rule on variational preferences, the largest possible prior by prior updating set satisfies
Axiom 12, whereas the smallest satisfies Axiom 13. Anything in between, satisfies
Axiom 14. However, if Dh is a strict subset of La, then Axiom 12 may be violated.
Lemma 4. Suppose that % is a confidence preference. Then, the updating rule de-
scribed above generates confidence preferences {%E,h}E∈E,h∈F that satisfy Bayesian
updating of subjective beliefs and Axiom 14. Moreover, if Df = La for all f ∈ F , then
Axiom 12 is satisfied. If Df = M(f) for all f ∈ F , then Axiom 13 is satisfied. If Dh
is a strict subset of La, then Axiom 12 may be violated.
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6 Speculative trade
In this and the next section, we show that weak DC has economic content in financial
markets. In particular, we show that Axiom 14, which is equivalent to Bayesian up-
dating of subjective beliefs, is the minimum requirement which precludes speculative
trade.
Consider an economy consisting of I agents, with |I| = m and typical element i.
Each agent’s consumption set is the set of acts F . He is endowed with a collection of
convex preferences {%iE,h}E∈E,h∈F .
An economy is a tuple 〈{%iE,h}i∈I,E∈E,h∈F , e, {Πi}i∈I〉, where e ∈ RS++ is the aggre-
gate endowment and {Πi}i∈I denotes the information structure, where each Πi ⊆ E is
a partition of S. If in period 0 the resulting allocation is f , then in period 1 and at
state s, agent i considers states in Πi(s) to be possible and has conditional preferences
%i
Πi(s),f i
.
An allocation is a tuple f = (f1, . . . , fm) ∈ Fm. It is feasible if ∑mi=1 f i = e.
It is interior if f i(s) > 0 for all s ∈ S and for all i. Given an event E ⊆ S, let
Ki(E) = {s ∈ S : Πi(s) ⊆ E} be the set of states where i knows E. Event E is self
evident if E ⊆ Ki(E) for all i ∈ I. That is, an event is self evident if whenever it
happens, everyone knows it. An event F is common knowledge at s if and only if there
exists a self evident event E such that s ∈ E ⊆ F (Aumann [1976]).
We say that there is speculative trade if an allocation is ex ante Pareto efficient
(according to preferences {%i}i∈I) but at some state s ∈ S it is common knowledge
that there exists a Pareto improvement.
Definition 5. There is speculative trade in economy 〈{%iE,h}i∈I,E∈E,h∈F , e, {Πi}i∈I〉 at
an ex ante Pareto efficient allocation f if there is agent j ∈ I, state s′ and feasible
allocation g such that event H = {s ∈ S : gi %i
Πi(s),f i
f i for all i ∈ I and gj j
Πj(s),fj
f j} is common knowledge at s′.
We now show that under Strong Monotonicity, Axiom 14 is necessary and sufficient
for preventing speculative trade. In particular, if all agents satisfy Axiom 14 then there
is no speculative trade, whereas if at least one fails it, there are economies with spec-
ulative trade. Let P be the collection of convex preferences {%E,h}E∈E,h∈F satisfying
Axiom 6. Note that we do not require Consequentialism or Status Quo Bias.
Proposition 3. If {%iE,h}i∈I,E∈E,h∈F ∈ PI satisfy Axiom 14 then there is no specula-
tive trade in any economy 〈{%iE,h}i∈I,E∈E,h∈F , e, {Πi}i∈I〉 and at any interior allocation
f . Conversely, if {%kE,h}E∈E,h∈F ∈ P fails Axiom 14 then there exist preferences {%iE,h
}i∈I,E∈E,h∈F ∈ PI satisfying Axiom 14 and economy 〈{%iE,h}i∈I∪{k},E∈E,h∈F , e, {Πi}i∈I∪{k}〉
such that there is speculative trade at an allocation f .
To provide a sketch of the proof for one direction, suppose by contradiction that
allocation {f i}i∈I is ex ante Pareto efficient but in the interim it is common knowledge
at some state s′ that allocation {gi}i∈I is a Pareto improvement. From Aumann [1976],
there exists a self evident event F containing s′, where s ∈ F implies gi Πi(s),f i f i
for all i ∈ I.14 Axiom 5 implies giΠi(s)f i Πi(s),f i f i. Because each Πi partitions F ,
14We can assume strict preference for everyone due to Strong Monotonicity.
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Axiom 14 implies Ep(giFf i) > Epf i for all p ∈ pii(f i). By convexity of preferences,
giFf i + (1 − )f i i f i for small enough  > 0, which contradicts that {f i}i∈I is ex
ante Pareto efficient.
Following Kajii and Ui [2009], Martins-da-Rocha [2010] also shows that Bayesian
updating of subjective beliefs precludes speculative trade. But both papers assume
Consequentialism, which is not needed here. Halevy [2004] proves the absence of spec-
ulative trade by assuming DC but relaxing Consequentialism to the following two
properties: Resolute Conditional preferences (which is similar to our Axiom 5) and
Conditional Decomposability (which we do not require). Ma [2001] proves the result
using DC and a weakening of Consequentialism, called piecewise monotonicity. Galanis
[2018] examines speculative trade in an environment with unawareness, where DC is
violated but Consequentialism is not.
7 The value of public information in competi-
tive risk-sharing environments
Hirshleifer [1971] first argued with an example that if agents trade in order to mu-
tually insure, then more public information could make everyone worse off. Schlee
[2001] generalised this result, showing that the value of public information is negative
in an expected utility model with a common prior, risk aversion and no aggregate
uncertainty.15
For general convex preferences, the notion of a common prior is not necessarily
well defined. However, we find that as long as Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs
and Status Quo Bias are satisfied, if every agent (weakly) values information, then
public information is (weakly) not valuable.16 This result provides further evidence
that Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs has economic content.
In order to rule out pure indifference to betting, we assume Strict Convexity and
Strong Monotonicity. We also assume the following axiom, which is proposed by RSS.
Axiom 16. (Translation Invariance at Certainty). For all acts h ∈ F and events
E ∈ E, for all g ∈ F and all constant bundles x, x′ > 0, if x + λg %E,h x for some
λ > 0, then there exists λ′ > 0 such that x′ + λ′g %E,h x′.
RSS show that Axiom 16 is satisfied by most classes of ambiguity averse preferences
and it implies that subjective beliefs do not change across constant acts: piiE,h(x) =
piiE,h(x
′) for all constant acts x, x′ > 0. We henceforth write piiE,h instead of pi
i
E,h(x) for
all constant acts x > 0.
We also impose a slight variation of Axiom 14. First, it applies only to constant
acts. Second, it should apply not only between the ex ante preference relation %∗ and
the interim %E,x, but also between %∗F,h and %E,x, where E ⊆ F and F ∈ E . In other
words, it is as if we consider a multi period model where the agent first learns F and
15Schlee [2001] uses the Blackwell [1951] criterion of more information. Moreover, he proves this result in
two other cases, that we do not examine. First, there are some risk neutral agents who fully insure the risk
averse ones. Second, all agents are risk averse and the economy has a representative agent.
16A similar result is shown by Galanis [2016], in an environment with unawareness, where DC is violated.
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then E. Adapting Proposition 2, there is Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs at a
constant act both when F occurs and when E occurs.17
Axiom 17. (Multi Period Weak Consistency of Implementation) For all acts x, g, h ∈
F , where x > 0 is constant, and events F,E ∈ E with E ⊆ F , if x %∗F,h g and x =Ec g
then x %E,x g.
We adapt the setting of Section 3 for the case of finitely many agents. There are two
periods, 0 and 1. In period 0, the agents’ common information structure about period
1 is represented by partition Π of S. Hence, there is symmetric information among all
agents. The initial allocation is {ei}i∈I , where ei ∈ F+.The aggregate endowment is∑
i∈I
ei = e ∈ RS++. We assume that there is no aggregate uncertainty, so e is constant
across all states in S. The economy in period 0 is a tuple 〈S,%1, . . . ,%m, e〉.
In period 1, all agents are informed that some event E ∈ Π has occurred and trade,
using their conditional preferences. Hence, information is symmetric. Trading at each
E ∈ Π generates an act for each agent, which is evaluated in period 0 using preference
relation %i.
Given event E ∈ Π, an allocation for economy 〈E,%1
E,hi
, . . . ,%mE,hm , e〉 is a tuple
fE = (f
1
E , . . . , f
m
E ) ∈ Fm.18 It is feasible if
∑m
i=1 f
i
E = e. It is interior if f
i
E(s) > 0 for
all s ∈ E and for all i. A feasible allocation fE is full insurance if each f iE is constant
across all states in E. It is Pareto optimal if there is no feasible allocation gE such
that giE %iE,hi f iE for all i ∈ I and gjE jE,hj f
j
E for some j ∈ I.
Fix a collection of convex preferences {%iE,h}i∈I,E∈E,h∈F . Let M = {Π, e} be an
aggregate decision problem, where Π ⊆ E is a partition of S and e ∈ RS++ is the
aggregate endowment, assumed constant across states.
Given event E ∈ Π and economy 〈E,%1
E,hi
, . . . ,%mE,hm , e〉, define fE = {f iE}i∈I ∈
Fm to be an equilibrium allocation if it is feasible and there are prices p ∈ RS+, with
p(s) = 0 if s /∈ E, such that, for each i ∈ I, Epf iE ≤ Epei and f iE %iE,hi g for all g such
that Epg ≤ Epei.
We say that interior allocation {f i}i∈I is admissible for aggregate decision problem
M = {Π, e} if, for each agent i ∈ I, for each E ∈ Π, f i =E f iE , where fE = {f iE}i∈I
is an equilibrium allocation of economy 〈E,%1E,f1 , . . . ,%mE,fm , e〉. In words, {f i}i∈I is
admissible if, under some equilibrium, agent i receives f iE at each E ∈ Π.
We compare aggregate decision problems by evaluating the admissible acts they
generate.
Definition 6. Aggregate decision problem M1 = {Π1, e} is not more valuable than
M2 = {Π2, e} if whenever {gi}i∈I is admissible for M2, there exists {f i}i∈I which
is admissible for M1 and gi %i f i, for all i ∈ I. It is weakly not more valuable if
agi + (1− a)f i % f i for some a ∈ (0, 1].
17Recall that Definition 4 requires that every subjective belief is updated, however it is allowed that more
such beliefs are included. Hence, although Axiom 14 implies Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs between
%∗ and %E,f and between %∗ and %F,f , it does not imply Bayesian updating between %∗F,h and %E,f .
18Note that we define the aggregate endowment of the economy as a map from S (rather than E) to R++.
This is without loss of generality because, from Axiom 5, what the endowment prescribes outside of E is
irrelevant. For consistency, we do the same for all subsequent acts.
18
We say that public information is (weakly) not valuable if an aggregate decision
problem with a finer partition is always (weakly) not more valuable than a decision
problem with a coarser partition.
Definition 7. Public information is (weakly) not valuable for {%iE,h}i∈I,E∈E,h∈F if,
for all endowments e and partitions Π1,Π2 of S, Π1 finer than Π2, aggregate decision
problem M1 = {Π1, e} is (weakly) not more valuable than M2 = {Π2, e}.
The following Proposition shows that if information is (weakly) valuable for each
agent, then public information is (weakly) not valuable.
Proposition 4. Suppose convex preferences {%iE,h}i∈I,E∈E,h∈F satisfy Axioms 6, 7,
11, 16 and 17. If information is (weakly) valuable for all i ∈ I then public information
is (weakly) not valuable for {%iE,h}i∈I,E∈E,h∈F .
8 Discussion
Before discussing the literature, we compare our approach with Ghirardato et al. [2004]
and Hanany and Klibanoff [2007, 2009], which are closely related. These papers study
preferences over acts which are functions f : S → X, where X is the set of simple
lotteries over a set of consequences Z. In order to compare our approach with theirs,
we assume that Z = R+. Let FAA be the set of such acts. Then, every f ∈ F can be
identified as act fAA ∈ FAA, where fAA(s) is a degenerate lottery that puts probability
1 to outcome f(s). Given acts f, g ∈ FAA, denote by a⊗ f + (1− a)⊗ g the act which
gives, at each state s, f(s) with probability a and g(s) with probability (1 − a). Our
notion of revealed preference in the bigger domain FAA is defined as follows. For all
f, g ∈ FAA, f %∗AA g if f % a⊗ g + (1− a)⊗ f for all a ∈ [0, 1].
8.1 Unambiguous preferences
Ghirardato et al. [2004] define f to be unambiguously preferred to g, written f %∗GMM g,
if mixing with any other act h does not reverse preferences: α ⊗ f + (1 − α) ⊗ h %
α ⊗ g + (1 − α) ⊗ h for all acts f, g, h ∈ FAA and α ∈ (0, 1]. Our notion of revealed
preference (given Consequentialism) applies to a smaller domain F but requires mixing
only with h = f , so that f %∗ g if f % ag + (1 − a)f for all f, g,∈ F and a ∈ [0, 1].
However, when our notion of revealed preference is applied in the bigger domain, it is
weaker. That is, f %∗GMM g implies f %∗AA g for all f, g ∈ FAA.
Although their representation is in a setting which satisfies the Certainty Indepen-
dence Axiom of Gilboa and Schmeidler [1989], Cerreia-Vioglio et al. [2011] show that it
holds more generally for uncertainty averse preferences. In particular, they show that
f %∗GMM g if and only if
∫
u(f)dp ≥ ∫ u(g)dp for all p ∈ C, where C = cl(co( ⋃
f∈F
piu0 (f)))
and piu0 (f) = {p ∈ ∆S : f % g for all g such that Epu(f) ≥ Epu(g)} is the set of sub-
jective beliefs evaluated at u(f), rather than at f , as is piu(f).
Ghirardato et al. [2008] provide a dynamic version of Ghirardato et al. [2004],
assuming Axioms 5, 10 and DC on %∗GMM , so that f %∗GMM,E g if and only if f %∗GMM
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g, for all acts f, g with f =Ec g. They show that Bayesian updating of all beliefs in C
is equivalent to %∗GMM satisfying DC.
8.2 Uncertainty averse preferences
Hanany and Klibanoff [2007] relax Consequentialism, allowing for preferences condi-
tional on an event to also depend on the feasible set B of acts and on the act that was
chosen ex ante. They show in the MEU model that a weakening of DC is equivalent to
Bayesian updating of a subset of the unconditional beliefs. Moreover, their model allows
for both Ellsberg type behavior and non-reversal of preferences when information is
revealed, hence DC is satisfied. Hanany and Klibanoff [2009] generalise their approach
to models that satisfy the uncertainty aversion axiom Schmeidler [1989], showing that
their Dynamic Consistency Axiom is equivalent to having at least one measure which
supports both the conditional indifference curve at the chosen act and its conditional
optimality.
To explain their approach, let Q be the set of all quadruples (%, E, f,B), where
non-null E is the conditioning event and act f ∈ FAA is optimally chosen from a convex
feasible set B ∈ B (f % g for all g ∈ B), before the realization of E, where B is the
set of all convex and compact sets. Let D ⊆ Q be a domain if (%, E, f,B) ∈ D implies
(%, E, f ′, B′) ∈ D for each f ′, B′ such that (%, E, f ′, B′) ∈ Q and u ◦ f ′ is the unique
maximizer of V (which represents preferences) over u◦B′. Their Dynamic Consistency
axiom is the following.
Axiom 18. (DCHK) For any (%, E, f,B) ∈ D, if g ∈ B with f =Ec g, then f %E,f,B g.
The main difference of their approach is that preferences depend not only on the
conditioning event E and act f , but also on the feasible set B. Compared to theirs,
the present paper additionally imposes that %E,f,B=%E,f,B′ for all convex feasible sets
B and B′. Moreover, % is defined on the smaller domain F , whereas their domain is
FAA.
To compare the two approaches, fix a preference relation % on FAA and consider
the following axiom, recalling that every f ∈ F can be identified as act fAA ∈ FAA,
where fAA(s) is a degenerate lottery that puts probability 1 to outcome f(s). Slightly
abusing notation, we denote fAA by f .
Axiom 19. For all f, g ∈ F and all a ∈ [0, 1], af + (1− a)g % a⊗ f + (1− a)⊗ g.
This axiom specifies that, given any acts f, g ∈ F , the agent always prefers an act
which gives, at state s, the expected payoff af(s)+(1−a)g(s) ∈ Z for sure rather than
the act a ⊗ f + (1 − a) ⊗ g, which at s is the lottery that gives f(s) with probability
a and g(s) with probability 1− a. It is satisfied in the case of variational and smooth
convex preferences with concave u and φ, together with the usual monotonicity axiom:
h(s) % k(s) for all s ∈ S implies h % k. The following lemma shows that under this
axiom and given that conditional preferences do not depend on the feasible set B,
DCHK implies Axiom 14.
Lemma 5. Suppose %E,f,B=%E,f,B′ for all convex feasible sets B and B′. Then,
Axioms 18 and 19 imply Axiom 14.
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Axiom 14 applies to a more restrictive domain than that of Axiom 18, hence the
converse cannot be true. However, if we restate Axiom 14 in the bigger FAA domain,
then the two axioms are equivalent. Recall that f %∗AA g if f % a ⊗ g + (1 − a) ⊗ f
for all a ∈ [0, 1], where f, g ∈ FAA. For simplicity, we assume that all acts in FAA are
strictly positive in utility space (the interior acts in Hanany and Klibanoff [2009]).
Axiom 20. For all acts f, g ∈ FAA and events E ∈ E, if f %∗AA g and f =Ec g then
f %E,f g.
We now show that the two axioms are equivalent, given that conditional preferences
do not depend on the feasible set B.
Lemma 6. Suppose %E,f,B=%E,f,B′ for all convex feasible sets B and B′. Then,
Axiom 18 is equivalent to Axiom 20.
In general, however, where %E,f,B 6=%E,f,B′ is allowed, Axiom 20 is stronger than
Axiom 18, as it requires that %F,f,B=%F,f,B′ for all B,B′. The characterizations in
Hanany and Klibanoff [2007, 2009] are provided for this general case, except for the
smooth ambiguity model, where there is a unique subjective belief at each f .
We now show that, in the case of variational preferences where subjective beliefs
are not unique and %F,f,B 6=%F,f,B′ , a rule proposed by Hanany and Klibanoff [2009]
which satisfies Axiom 18 implies that at least one subjective belief is updated, but not
all. This means that Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs and Axiom 14 fail.19
Fix r ∈M(f)∩QE,f,B, where QE,f,B is the set of measures which, when conditioned
on E, support the conditional optimality of f in B.20 The ambiguity index of their
proposed updating rule is
cE,f,B(p) =
1
r(E)
[
c(p⊗E r)− min
q∈∆E
c(q ⊗E r)
]
. (3)
Note that for all p ∈ ∆E, ∫ u(f)dp+ cE,f,B(p) ≥ ∫ u(f)drE + cE,f,B(rE) if and only if
r(E)
∫
u(f)dp+c(p⊗Er) ≥ r(E) ∫ u(f)drE+c(r), which is true because ∫ u(f)dp⊗Er =
r(E)
∫
u(f)dp+
∫
Ec u(f)dr and r ∈M(f). Using the proof of Lemma 9, we can show
that the subjective belief generated by r is updated.
If, however, q ∈M(f) and q 6= r, then it is not necessarily the case that ∫ u(f)dp+
cE,f,B(p) ≥
∫
u(f)dqE + cE,f,B(qE) for all p ∈ ∆E, which means that the subjective
belief generated by q is not updated. The reason is that we need r(E)
∫
u(f)dp+c(p⊗E
r) ≥ r(E) ∫ u(f)dqE + c(qE ⊗E r), which is equivalent to ∫ u(f)dp⊗E r + c(p⊗E r) ≥∫
u(f)dqE ⊗E r+ c(qE ⊗E r), however if qE ⊗E r /∈M(f) this may not be true. Hence,
not all subjective beliefs are updated and Axiom 14 is violated.
To provide a numerical example, consider the setting of Section 1.1 with MEU ex
ante preferences, u(x) = x and C being the convex hull of the following three measures:
p1 = (0.24, 0.33, 0.43), p2 = (0.34, 0.2, 0.46) and p3 = (0.21, 0.68, 0.11). Let f = x ∈ R
be a constant act and note that M(f) = C. Pick r = p1 and define feasible set B
19Recall that Axiom 14 is the minimum requirement which ensures that there is no speculative trade, as
we show in Proposition 3.
20The formal definition of QE,f,B is in Hanany and Klibanoff [2009].
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such that f ∈ B if Erx ≥ Erf . Then, p1 ∈ M(f) ∩ QE,f,B. If we pick p1 to generate
cE,x,B, using (3), then we have that p2E ⊗E p1 = {0.3589, 0.2111, 0.4300} /∈ C. This
means that cE,x,B(p2E) = +∞ and p2E /∈ME,x(x), hence not all subjective beliefs are
updated.
Finally, we show that in the smooth ambiguity model (Maccheroni et al. [2006a]),
where subjective beliefs are unique at each f , Hanany and Klibanoff [2009] propose a
rule which satisfies Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs. An act f is weakly preferred
to g if and only if Eµφ(Epu ◦ f) ≥ Eµφ(Epu ◦ g), where φ : R → R is an increasing
transformation called the ambiguity attitude and µ is a subjective probability over the
set of probability measures p ∈ ∆S that the agent considers relevant for his problem.
For simplicity, we assume that µ has finite support and that u and φ are concave,
increasing and differentiable, so that preferences are convex. We also assume Axiom
9, which implies that for each E ∈ p, there exists p ∈ supp(µ) with p(E) > 0.
Hanany and Klibanoff [2009] propose the smooth rule, which specifies that
µE,f (p) =
µ(p)p(E)
φ′(Ep(u◦f))
φ′(EpE (u◦f))∑
pˆ∈∆S
µ(pˆ)pˆ(E)
φ′(Epˆ(u◦f))
φ′(EpˆE (u◦f))
if p(E) > 0 and 0 otherwise.
The smooth rule satisfies the following condition, which Hanany and Klibanoff
[2009] show that it characterizes DCHK :
EµE,f [φ′(EpEu ◦ f)pE(s)]
EµE,f [φ′(EpEu ◦ f)]
=
Eµ[φ′(Epu ◦ f)p(s)]
Eµ[φ′(Epu ◦ f)p(E)] (4)
for all f ∈ F , s ∈ E and p ∈ supp(µ) with p(E) > 0.21 We show that (4) satisfies
Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs.
Lemma 7. There is Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs for any rule satisfying (4).
8.3 Related literature
Cerreia-Vioglio et al. [2011] study general convex preferences which satisfy the uncer-
tainty aversion axiom of Schmeidler [1989]. Epstein and Schneider [2003], Maccheroni
et al. [2006b] and Klibanoff et al. [2009] use DC in order to provide recursive repre-
sentations for the static models of Gilboa and Schmeidler [1989], Maccheroni et al.
[2006a] and Klibanoff et al. [2005], respectively. Several other papers employ DC, such
as Eichberger and Kelsey [1996], Eichberger et al. [2005], Takashi [2005] Sarin and
Wakker [1998], Wang [2003] and Hayashi and Miao [2011].
Siniscalchi [2011] drops DC completely and replaces it with Consistent Planning,
which specifies that the agent adjusts his actions today in order to restrict his future
self’s choices, because he recognises that his preferences will change tomorrow. This
approach accommodates Ellsberg but information is not valuable, unless the agent can
exogenously commit.
21Note that we state the condition on F , whereas Hanany and Klibanoff [2009] state it on FAA.
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Bayesian updating of priors is suggested or characterized by Jaffray [1992, 1994],
Fagin and Halpern [1991], Wasserman and Kadane [1990], Walley [1991], Epstein and
Schneider [2003], Sarin and Wakker [1998], Pires [2002], Siniscalchi [2001], Wang [2003]
and Faro and Lefort [2013]. Ghirardato et al. [2008] characterize the Bayesian updating
of a set of beliefs which are used to represent the unambiguous preference relation
(Ghirardato et al. [2004]), which is incomplete. Gilboa and Schmeidler [1993] analyze
maximum likelihod updating, whereas Dempster [1968] and Shafer [1976] suggest the
Dempster-Shafer updating rule. Epstein [2006] provides an axiomatic model of non-
Bayesian updating.
Another property of Consequentialism (which we call Conditional Preference in this
paper and assume it throughout) is that conditional on an event E, the agent only cares
about what the act prescribes inside E. Dominiak et al. [2012] show experimentally
that subjects are more prone to violate DC than this property.
RSS identify the subjective beliefs generated by a large number of models of am-
biguity aversion, based on an idea of Yaari [1969], making our approach very general.
These models are the convex Choquet model of Schmeidler [1989], the multiple priors
model of Gilboa and Schmeidler [1989], the variational preferences model of Maccheroni
et al. [2006a], the multiplier model of Hansen and Sargent [2001], the smooth second-
order prior models of Klibanoff et al. [2005] and Nau [2006], the confidence preferences
model of Chateauneuf and Faro [2009] and the second-order expected utility model of
Ergin and Gul [2009].22 Ghirardato and Siniscalchi [2018] extend the approach of RSS
to non convex preferences in order to characterize betting in terms of disjoint beliefs.
In dynamic models, Strzalecki [2013] examines the relationship between ambiguity
attitudes and attitudes about the timing of the resolution of uncertainty. Using the no-
tion of concordancy, Strzalecki and Werner [2011] define (and identify for a large class
of models of ambiguity aversion) the conditional probabilities induced by a partition
and a set of subjective beliefs. Their focus is different from ours, as they study the prop-
erties of measurability and comonotonicity of Pareto efficient allocations, with respect
to the aggregate endowment. Hanany et al. [2018] study dynamic games of incomplete
information with players that might be ambiguity averse and update using the smooth
rule. Ellis [2018] studies the effects of dynamic consistency and consequentialism on
ambiguous games.
In a setting with preferences over lotteries, Wakker [1988] shows that if Indepen-
dence is violated, the value of information is not always positive. Independence is
related to DC and, under some conditions (e.g. English auctions), it is equivalent
(Karni and Safra [1986]). Grant et al. [2000] provide necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for a weakly dynamically consistent agent to always prefer more information. Our
approach differs from theirs in two respects. First, they adopt the definition of “more
information” suggested by Blackwell [1951], whereas we adopt the definition of a finer
partition.23 Second, they adopt a different weakening of DC, due to Machina [1989],
which requires that an agent conforms to what he would have chosen ex ante only if
he were able to commit. Snow [2010] examines the value of information in the special
22Note that RSS adopts a domain of preferences over monetary acts, whereas these models allow for more
general domains.
23The two definitions are closely related, as shown by Green and Stokey [1978].
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case where it either reduces or eliminates ambiguity, using the model of Klibanoff et al.
[2005]. Li [2015] studies the link between ambiguity attitudes and aversion to receiving
information when one is completely uninformed. Galanis [2015] studies the value of in-
formation in an environment with unawareness, where DC is violated. Jakobsen [2016]
studies a revealed-preference model of information disclosure with SEU preferences.
He shows that his primitives are sufficient to uniquely identify tastes and beliefs and
determine whether beliefs are updated using Bayes’ rule.
8.4 Concluding remarks
It has long been established in the literature that ambiguity sensitive agents must
either fail DC or Consequentialism in some respect. Instead of proposing a particular
combination of these properties, we explore what is implied by their relaxation, in
terms of losing normatively appealing economic results. We first show that even if
Consequentialism is relaxed to Status Quo Bias, one part of DC is equivalent to positive
value of information in single agent decision problems. Hence, if the modeller is not
willing to allow agents who reject free information, DC has to be assumed as well.
However, we also show that a weakening of DC is equivalent to a suitable weakening
of the value of information, which requires that the agent prefers mixing between a
more informative and a less informative decision problem, rather than receiving the
less informative decision problem for sure. Moreover, the other part of weak DC is
equivalent to Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs.
Weak DC has economic content also in financial markets. First, subjective beliefs
can be interpreted as prices for Arrow-Debreu securities which characterize efficient al-
locations. Their Bayesian updating ensures that an ex ante efficient allocation remains
efficient in the interim stage and this is common knowledge, hence precluding spec-
ulative trade. Moreover, in risk-sharing environments without aggregate uncertainty,
public information is weakly not valuable for all agents, as it destroys opportunities
for them to mutually insure.
A Appendix
A.1 Revealed acts
In order to prove our results, we introduce the notion of revealed acts and connect it
with preference relation %∗. We have interpreted piuE,h(f) as the set of (normalized)
Arrow-Debreu prices for which the agent with preferences %E,h, endowed with f , would
have zero net demand. The “dual” of piuE,h(f) is the set of acts for which f is revealed
preferred to them. In particular, if Epf ≥ Epg then act g is affordable given normalized
price p and endowment f . If p ∈ piuE,h(f), then from Axiom 3 we have f %E,h g, which
means that f is revealed preferred to g. Formally, for act f and event E ∈ E , let
RuE,h(f) be the set of acts such that f is revealed preferred to them given preferences
%E,h,
RuE,h(f) = {g ∈ F : Epf ≥ Epg for some p ∈ piuE,h(f)}.
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If we use beliefs piwE,h(f), instead of pi
u
E,h(f), we get
RwE,h(f) = {g ∈ F : Epf ≥ Epg for some p ∈ piwE,h(f)}.
The connection between RwE,h,RuE,h and %∗E,h is given by the following Lemma.
Lemma 8. For all f, g, h ∈ F , f %∗E,h g implies g ∈ RwE,h(f) and g ∈ RuE,h(f) implies
f %∗E,h g.
Proof. Suppose f %∗E,h g, then f %E,h ag + (1 − a)f for all a ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose
g /∈ RwE,h(f), so that Epf < Epg for all p ∈ piwE,h(f). Because piwE,h(f) is a compact
and convex set, by definition we have g + (1− )f E,h f for sufficiently small  > 0,
a contradiction. Conversely, suppose g ∈ RuE,h(f), so that Epf ≥ Epg for some p ∈
piuE,h(f). This implies that for all a ∈ [0, 1], Epf ≥ aEpg + (1 − a)Epf . Axiom 3 and
the definition of piuE,h(f) imply f %E,h ag + (1− a)f , hence f %∗E,h g.
Proposition 1 in RSS shows that piE,h(f) = pi
u
E,h(f) = pi
w
E,h(f) for all strictly positive
acts f ∈ F+. Hence, RuE,h(f) = RwE,h(f) ≡ RE,h(f). Consider the following two
axioms, which are equivalent of the two axioms of weak DC, Axioms 14 and 15.
Axiom 21. (Weak Consistency of Implementation) For all acts f ∈ F+, g ∈ F and
events E ∈ E, if g ∈ Ru(f) and f =Ec g then f %E,f g.
Axiom 22. (Weak Information is Valuable) For all acts g ∈ F+, f ∈ F and events
E ∈ E, if f %E,f g, f =Ec g and g  f then f /∈ Rw(g).
We therefore have the following Corollary.
Corollary 1. For all f ∈ F+, g, h ∈ F , f %∗E,h g if and only if g ∈ RE,h(f). Hence,
Axiom 14 is equivalent to Axiom 21 and Axiom 15 is equivalent to 22.
A.2 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose Axioms 11, 13 and let f % g with f =Ec g. From Axiom
7, for all a ∈ (0, 1), af + (1 − a)g  g. Axiom 13 implies af + (1 − a)g E,g g for
all a ∈ (0, 1). Because lim
a→1
[af + (1 − a)g] = f , Axiom 2 implies f %E,g g. Axiom 11
implies f %E,f g.
Conversely, suppose Axioms 10, 12 and let f %E,f g with f =Ec g. From Axiom 7,
for all a ∈ (0, 1), af + (1− a)g E,f g. Axiom 10 implies af + (1− a)g E,g g. Axiom
12 implies af + (1− a)g  g for all a ∈ (0, 1). Because lim
a→1
[af + (1− a)g] = f , Axiom
2 implies f % g.
For the second claim, using Corollary 1 suppose Axioms 11, 15, g ∈ R(f), f =Ec g
and g E,f f . Axiom 11 implies g %E,g f . If f  g then Axiom 15 and Corollary 1
imply g /∈ R(f), a contradiction. Suppose g % f . From Axiom 7 we have af+(1−a)g 
f for all a ∈ (0, 1). This implies that Ep(af + (1 − a)g) > Epf for all p ∈ pi(f). But
then Epg > Epf for all p ∈ pi(f) and g /∈ R(f), a contradiction.
Conversely, suppose Axioms 10, 14, f %E,f g, f =Ec g and g  f . From Axiom 7,
we have that af+(1−a)g E,f g for all a ∈ (0, 1). Axiom 10 implies af+(1−a)g E,g g.
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Axiom 14 and Corollary 1 imply that af+(1−a)g /∈ R(g), hence Ep(af+(1−a)g) > Epg
for all p ∈ pi(g). But this implies that Epf > Epg for all p ∈ pi(g), hence f /∈ R(g) and
g 6%∗ f .
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose that for some p ∈ piuE,h(f) we have p(F ) = 0. Take any g
such that g =F c f . Because Epf = Epg, we have f %E,h g, implying that F is weakly
%E,h-null. Conversely, suppose that for all acts f , p ∈ piwE,h(f) implies p(F ) > 0.
Suppose there exists act f such that for all g with f =F c g, f %E,h g. Let k > 0
and define act g such that g(s) = f(s) + k if s ∈ F and g(s) = f(s) otherwise. Then,
for all p ∈ piwE,h(f), Epg > Epf . From the definition of piwE,h(f), there exists small
enough  > 0, such that g′ = g + (1 − )f and g′  f . Because f =F c g′, we have a
contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 1. Recall that convex preferences satisfy Axioms 1 through 5.
Suppose that for any event E ∈ E and all acts f, g ∈ F , f %E,f g and f =Ec g implies
f % g. Consider decision problems D1 = {Π1,A} and D2 = {Π2,A}, where Π1,Π2 ⊆ E
are partitions of S and Π1 is finer than Π2. Let act f ∈ FD1 be optimal for D1 and
act g ∈ FD2 be optimal for D2. Since Π2 is coarser than Π1, FD2 ⊆ FD1 and g ∈ FD1 .
This means that, for all E ∈ Π1, f %E,f g.
Enumerate the partition cells of Π1 = {E1, . . . , En}. If n = 1 then Π1 = {S} is
the uninformative partition and the result is immediate, so suppose that n ≥ 2. For
cell 1 ≤ k ≤ n define act hk as follows. Let hk(s) = f(s) if s ∈ Ej , where 1 ≤ j ≤ k,
and hk(s) = g(s) otherwise. Note that hn = f and let h0 = g. From Axiom 5 we have
that, for each 1 ≤ k ≤ n, f %Ek,f g implies hk %Ek,f hk−1. From Axiom 11 we have
hk %Ek,hk hk−1. Applying Axiom 13 we have hk % hk−1, for each 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Axiom 1
implies that f % g.
Conversely, suppose that Axiom 13 is false, so that for some event E ∈ E and acts
f, g ∈ F , we have f %E,f g and f =Ec g but g  f . Consider partitions Π1 = {E,Ec}
and Π2 = {S}. Let A = {f, g}. Then, g is optimal for decision problem D2 = {Π2,A}.
Because f =Ec g, Axiom 5 implies that f %Ec,f g. Since f %E,f g, we have that f is
optimal for decision problem D1 = {Π1,A}. Because g  f , D1 is not more valuable
than D2, hence information is not valuable.
For the second claim, suppose Axiom 15, which from Corollary 1 implies Axiom
22. Consider the same decision problems as in the first paragraph of this proof (where
now A ⊆ F+) and let act f ∈ FD1 be optimal for D1 and act g ∈ FD2 be optimal for
D2. Since Π2 is coarser than Π1, FD2 ⊆ FD1 and g ∈ FD1 . This means that, for all
E ∈ Π1, f %E,f g. If f % g then for a = 1 we have af + (1− a)g % g and information
is weakly valuable.
Suppose g  f . For each E ∈ Π1, Axiom 5 and f %E,f g imply fEg %E,f g.
Axiom 11 implies that fEg %E,fEg g. From Axiom 22, either fEg % g or g  fEg
and fEg /∈ R(g), which implies that EpfEg ≥ Epg for all p ∈ pi(g). Because Π1 is a
partition of S, we have that Epf ≥ Epg for all p ∈ pi(g).
If it is not the case that fEg ∼ g for some E ∈ Π1, then either fEg  g or
fEg /∈ R(g), both implying EpfEg > Epg for all p ∈ pi(g). Hence, if it is not the
case that fEg ∼ g for some E ∈ Π1, we have that Epf > Epg for all p ∈ pi(g). By
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the definition of piw(g), there exists a ∈ (0, 1) such that af + (1 − a)g  g, hence
information is weakly valuable.
Suppose now that for all E ∈ Π1, fEg ∼ g  f . Note that
∑
E∈Π1
1
kfEg =
1
kf+
k−1
k g,
where k is the number of Π1’s partition cells. Because fEg % g for each E ∈ Π1, Axiom
4 implies 1kf +
k−1
k g % g. By setting a =
1
k , information is weakly valuable.
Conversely, suppose that information is weakly valuable and Axiom 8 is satisfied.
Using Corollary 1, we only need to show that Axiom 22 is satisfied. Suppose that for
some event E ∈ E and acts f ∈ F , g ∈ F+, we have f %E,f g, f =Ec g, g  f but
f ∈ R(g). Suppose f is not strictly positive, so that for some set A ⊆ E (because g
is strictly positive and f =Ec g), we have f(s) = 0 if and only if s ∈ A. If Epg > Epf
for some p ∈ pi(g), Axiom 2 implies that we can find strictly positive act f ′ ∈ F+, by
infinitesimally increasing the payoff for all states in A, such that f ′ %E,f g, f ′ =Ec g,
g  f ′ but f ′ ∈ R(g). If Epg ≤ Epf for all p ∈ pi(g), f ∈ R(g) implies Epg = Epf for
some p ∈ pi(g). By taking a convex combination of f and g, with large weight on f ,
Axioms 2, 4 and the definition of pi imply that we can find a strictly positive f ′ such
that f ′ %E,f g, f ′ =Ec g, g  f ′ but f ′ ∈ R(g).
From Axiom 11 we have f ′ %E,f ′ g, so wlog we set f = f ′. Because f ∈ R(g), we
have that Epg ≥ Epf for some p ∈ pi(g). Construct the same decision problems, D1 and
D2, as in the third paragraph of the proof. Because information is weakly valuable and
Π1 is finer than Π2, we have that D1 is weakly more valuable than D2. This implies
that af + (1− a)g % g for some a ∈ (0, 1].
From Axiom 4 we have that, for all b ∈ [0, 1], b(af + (1 − a)g) + (1 − b)g =
abf + (1 − ab)g % g, hence, for all c ∈ (0, a], cf + (1 − c)g % g. If cf + (1 − c)g  g
for some c, then Ep(cf + (1− c)g) > Epg for all p ∈ pi(g), contradicting Epg ≥ Epf for
some p ∈ pi(g). We therefore have cf + (1 − c)g ∼ g for all c ∈ (0, a]. Because g  f ,
Axiom 8 is contradicted.
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose subjective beliefs are updated using Bayes’ rule. Fix
event E ∈ E and f ∈ F+. Suppose f %∗ g and f =Ec g. Using Corollary 1, we have
g ∈ R(f). Then, Epf ≥ Epg for some p ∈ pi(f). Axiom 9 and Lemma 2 imply that
p(E) > 0. Because subjective beliefs are updated using Bayes’ rule and f =Ec g, we
have EpEf ≥ EpEg and pE ∈ piE,f (f). Axioms 1 and 3 imply f %E,f g.
Conversely, suppose Axiom 14 and that there exist f ∈ F+, p ∈ pi(f) with p(E) > 0
and pE /∈ piE,f (f). Then, there exists act g such that g E,f f and EpEg = EpEf . From
Axiom 5 we have gEf E,f f . Because EpE (gEf) = EpEf and gEf =Ec f , we have
that Ep(gEf) = Epf , hence gEf ∈ R(f). From Corollary 1 Axiom 14 implies Axiom
21, hence f %E,f gEf , a contradiction.
The following is used in the proof of Lemmas 3 and 4.
Lemma 9. Suppose that {%E,h}E∈E,h∈F are convex variational or confidence prefer-
ences and satisfy Axiom 9, where u is concave, increasing and differentiable. Suppose
that for all f and all r ∈ M(f), if r(E) > 0 then rE ∈ ME,f (f). Then, Bayesian
updating of subjective beliefs and Axiom 14 are satisfied.
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Proof. We show that there is Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs and then in-
voke Proposition 2, applied to strictly positive acts. Let U : RS+ → RS be the
function U(f) = (u(f(1), . . . , u(f(S)))), giving ex post utilities in each state. For
any f ∈ RS++, let DU(f) be the S × S diagonal matrix with diagonal given by
the vector of ex post marginal utilities (u′(f(1), . . . , u′(f(S)))). From Propositions
3 (for variational preferences) and 4 (for confidence preferences) in RSS, we have that
pi(f) =
{
q
‖q‖ : q = pDU(f) for some p ∈M(f)
}
.
Suppose q ∈ pi(f) and q(E) > 0 where, without loss of generality, ‖q‖ = 1 and
q = rDU(f) for r ∈ M(f). This means that q(s) = r(s)u′(f(s)) for each s ∈ S.
Because rE ∈ ME,f (f), we have q′E ∈ piE,f (f) where, for each s ∈ E, q′E(s) =
r(s)u′(f(s))
r(E)(
∑
s′∈E
r(s′)
r(E)
u′(f(s′)))
= r(s)u
′(f(s))
(
∑
s′∈E
r(s′)u′(f(s′))) = qE(s), which implies q
′
E = qE ∈ piE,f (f).
If u is strictly increasing, then Axiom 9 is equivalent to requiring that the ambiguity
index is finite only for beliefs that assign positive probability to all events in E .
Lemma 10. If u is strictly increasing, then Axiom 9 is equivalent to requiring that for
all E ∈ E and all p ∈ ∆E, p(E) = 0 implies cE,h(p) = +∞.
Proof of Lemma 10. Fix F,E ∈ E with F ⊆ E and h ∈ F . We then need to show that
the following are equivalent.
• cE,h(p) 6= +∞ for some p ∈ ∆E such that p(F ) = 0,
• F is weakly %E,h-null.
Let PF ⊆ ∆E be such that p ∈ PF implies cE,h(p) 6= +∞ and p(F ) = 0. Suppose
PF 6= ∅. Let fF,k be the act such that fF,k(s) = k > 0 if s ∈ F and fF,k(s) = 0
otherwise. For any act g and p ∈ PF , note that
∫
u(g)dp+c(p) =
∫
u(g+fF,k)dp+c(p)
for all k > 0. This implies that for big enough k∗, ME,h(g+fF,k∗) ⊆ PF . Moreover, for
all k > 0, g+(fF,k∗+fF,k) ∼E,h g+fF,k∗ . Suppose there exists g′ with g+fF,k∗ =F c g′,
such that g′ E,h g+fF,k∗ . Set k′ = max
s∈F
g′(s). From Axiom 3, g+(fF,k∗+fF,k′) %E,h g′.
But this implies g + (fF,k∗ + fF,k′) E,h g + fF,k∗ , a contradiction. Therefore, F is
weakly %E,h-null.
Conversely, suppose F is weakly %E,h-null. Then, there exists g such that, for
all g′ with g =F c g′, we have g %E,h g′. Suppose that for each p ∈ ∆E, p(F ) = 0
implies cE,h(p) = +∞. Then, p ∈ ME,h(f) implies p(F ) > 0, for all f ∈ F . Because∫
u(g)dp + c(p) <
∫
u(g + fF,k)dp + c(p) for all p with p(F ) > 0 and some k > 0, we
have that g + fF,k E,h g, a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 3. To show convexity of cE,f , we need to establish that cE,f (ap+(1−
a)p′) ≤ acE,f (p) + (1− a)cE,fc(p′) for all p, p′ ∈ ∆E. Using (1), we need to show that∫
u(f)dnE,f (ap+(1−a)p′)+c(nE,f (ap+(1−a)p′)) ≤ a(
∫
u(f)dnE,f (p)+c(nE,f (p)))+
(1− a)(∫ u(f)dnE,f (p′) + c(nE,f (p′))).
For the first rule, if cE,f (p), cE,f (p
′) 6= +∞, then there exist q, q′ ∈ ∆S such that
p ⊗E q, p′ ⊗E q′ ∈ Df and c(p ⊗E q), c(p′ ⊗E q′) 6= +∞. From Lemma 1 in Araujo
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et al. [2016] there exists b such that the Bayesian update of bp ⊗E q + (1 − b)p′ ⊗E q′
is ap + (1 − a)p′. From the convexity of c, c(bp ⊗E q + (1 − b)p′ ⊗E q′) 6= +∞. From
the convexity of Df , bp ⊗E q + (1 − b)p′ ⊗E q′ ∈ Df and from the definition of the
updating rule, ap+(1−a)p′ ∈ DfE and cE,f (ap+(1−a)p′) 6= +∞. But this means that
nE,f (ap + (1 − a)p′) = nE,f (p) = nE,f (p′), so the inequality is true. If cE,f (p) = +∞
or cE,f (p
′) +∞, then the inequality is trivially satisfied. For the second rule, again
from Lemma 1 in Araujo et al. [2016] and because p ⊗E r(E) = p′ ⊗E r(E), we have
that nE,f (ap + (1 − a)p′) = (ap + (1 − a)p′) ⊗E r = ap ⊗E r + (1 − a)p′ ⊗E r, so the
inequality is true.
To show lower semi continuity, note that for all p with cE,f (p) 6= +∞, for the first
updating rule the first two and the last term are constant, whereas the third term is a
linear function of p. For the second rule, cE,f (p) is the sum of continuous functions of
p.
To show Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs, suppose that q ∈M(f) and q(E) >
0. For both updating rules, nE,f (qE) = r for some r ∈ M(f) with r(E) > 0 and
rE = qE . Let pE ∈ ∆E and denote nE,f (pE) by p. We then have
∫
u(f)dr + c(r) ≤∫
u(f)dp+c(p). By substituting from equation (1), we have that
∫
u(f)drE+cE,f (rE)+
kE,f ≤
∫
u(f)dpE+cE,f (pE)+kE,f , hence
∫
u(f)dqE+cE,f (qE) ≤
∫
u(f)dpE+cE,f (pE)
and qE ∈ME,f (f). From Lemma 9, Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs and Axiom
14 are satisfied.
To show that Df = D for all f ∈ F and p ∈ D for all p with c(p) 6= +∞, implies
Axiom 12, suppose f % g and f =Ec g. This implies that
∫
u(f)dp+ c(p) ≥ ∫ u(g)dq+
c(q), where p ∈ M(f) and q ∈ M(g). Suppose that g E,f f . Substituting from
equation (1), we have that UE,f (f) =
∫
u(f)dr + c(r)− kE,f for some fixed r ∈ M(f)
and UE,f (g) =
∫
u(f)dr+ c(r)− kE,f + min
t∈DE
{∫ u(g)dt− ∫ u(f)dt}. Because g E,f f ,
we have that
∫
u(g)dt >
∫
u(f)dt, for all t ∈ DE . Because p(E) > 0 for all p with
c(p) 6= +∞ and q ∈ D, we have qE ∈ DE and
∫
u(g)dqE >
∫
u(f)dqE . From f =Ec g,∫
u(g)dqE >
∫
u(f)dqE implies that
∫
u(g)dq+c(q) >
∫
u(f)dq+c(q) ≥ ∫ u(f)dp+c(p).
Because p ∈M(f) and q ∈M(g) we have g  f , a contradiction.
To show that Df = M(f), for all f ∈ F , implies Axiom 13, suppose that f %E,f g
and f =Ec g. From the calculations of the previous paragraph, we have that UE,f (f) ≥
UE,f (g) if and only if min
t∈DfE
{∫ u(g)dt− ∫ u(f)dt} ≤ 0, which implies that ∫ u(g)dtE ≤∫
u(f)dtE for some tE ∈ DfE . Since Df = M(f), there exists t ∈M(f) whose Bayesian
update is tE . Because f =Ec g, we have that U(f) =
∫
u(f)dt+c(t) ≥ ∫ u(g)dt+c(t) ≥∫
u(g)dq + c(q) = U(g), where q ∈M(g). This implies that f % g.
To show that these updating rules do not imply Axiom 12 and therefore fail DC,
consider the example of Section 1.1 with S = {s1, s2, s3} and E = {s1, s2}. The agent
has MEU ex ante preferences with u(x) = x and C being the convex hull of the following
three measures: p1 = (0.24, 0.33, 0.43), p2 = (0.34, 0.2, 0.46) and p3 = (0.21, 0.68, 0.11).
In this example each M(fi) is a singleton, so that M(f1) = M(f4) = {p3} and M(f2) =
M(f3) = {p2}. The subjective beliefs consist of the normalized vectors pDU(fi), where
p ∈ M(fi) and DU(fi) is a diagonal matrix, with a diagonal consisting of the ex post
marginal utilities, in this case 1’s. We then have that pi(f1) = pi(f4) = {p3} and
pi(f2) = pi(f3) = {p2}. Because u is linear, f1  f2 and M(f1) = p3, where f1 = (1, 0, 0)
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and f2 = (0, 1, 0).
For the first updating rule, let Df1 be the convex hull of p1 and p3, hence M(f1) ⊆
Df1 and Df1E is the convex hull of p1E and p3E . We then have that UE,f1(f1) =
min
p∈Df1E
{∫ u(f1)dp+cE,f1(p)} = ∫ u(f)dp3+c(p3)−kE,f1 and UE,f1(f2) = min
p∈Df1E
{∫ u(f2)dp+
cE,f1(p)} =
∫
u(f)dp3 + c(p3) − kE,f1 + min
p∈Df1E
{∫ u(f2)dp − ∫ u(f1)dp}. The last term
simplifies to min
p∈Df1E
{u(1)p(s2) − u(1)p(s1)}. Because p(s2) > p(s1) for all p ∈ Df1E , we
have f2 E,f1 f1.
To show that Axiom 13 is violated, it is enough to show that f2 E,f2 f1. Let
Df2 be the convex hull of p2 and p3. Noting that M(f2) = {p2}, we have UE,f2(f2) =
min
p∈Df2E
{∫ u(f2)dp+cE,f2(p)} = ∫ u(f)dp2+c(p2)−kE,f2 and UE,f2(f1) = min
p∈Df2E
{∫ u(f1)dp+
cE,f2(p)} =
∫
u(f)dp2 + c(p2) − kE,f2 + min
p∈Df2E
{∫ u(f1)dp − ∫ u(f2)dp}. The last term
simplifies to min
p∈Df2E
{u(1)p(s1) − u(1)p(s2)} = u(1)p3(E)(p3(s1) − u(1)p3(s2)) < 0, hence
f2 E,f2 f1 but f1  f2.
For the second updating rule we set nE,f1(p) = p ⊗E p3. Let CE be the Bayesian
updates of all elements of C, given E, consisting of the convex hull of p1E , p2E and
p3E . Note that if p /∈ CE , then cE,f1(p) = +∞. Applying (1) and excluding constant
kE,f1 we have UE,f1(f1) = min
p∈CE
{p(s1) + p(s1)p3(E) − p(s1)} = p3(s1) = 0.21 and
UE,f1(f2) = min
p∈CE
{p(s2) + p(s1)p3(E) − p(s1)} = min
p∈CE
{1 − p(s1)(1 + p3(s3))} = 1 −
p2E(s1)(1 + p3(s3)) = 0.3011. Hence, f2 E,f1 f1.
Proof of Lemma 4. Note that φE,h(p) is either 0 or equal to
φ(r)
kE,h
Epu(h)
Eru(h) , where
φ(r)
kE,hEru(h)
is constant. Hence, quasiconcavity and upper semicontinuouty are satisfied. Proposi-
tion 4 in RSS shows that pi(h) =
{
q
‖q‖ : q = pDU(h) for some p ∈M(h)
}
.
To show Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs, suppose that q ∈M(h) and q(E) >
0. By construction, qE ∈ DhE . Moreover, for all p ∈ DhE , Epu(h)φE,h(p) = kE,h
Eru(h)
φ(r) for some
fixed r ∈ M(h) with r(E) > 0, so it is independent of p. Hence, qE ∈ ME,h(h) =
LaE,h = D
h
E . From Lemma 9, Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs and Axiom 14
are satisfied.
Suppose now that Df = D = La, for all f ∈ F , and for all p ∈ D we have p(E) > 0,
f % g and f =Ec g. This implies that Epu(f)φ(p) ≥ Equ(g)φ(q) , where p ∈M(f) and q ∈M(g).
Suppose that g E,f f . Substituting from (2) we have that UE,f (f) = kE,fφ(r)Eru(f) for
some r ∈M(f) and UE,f (g) = kE,fφ(r)Eru(f) mint∈DE
Etu(g)
Etu(f) . Because g E,f f , we have that
Etu(g) > Etu(f), for all t ∈ DE . In particular, EqEu(g) > EqEu(f) and, since f =Ec g,
we have
Equ(g)
φ(q) >
Equ(f)
φ(q) ≥ Epu(f)φ(p) , a contradiction.
To show that Df = M(f), for all f ∈ F , implies Axiom 13, suppose that f %E,f g
and f =Ec g. From the calculations of the previous paragraph, we have that UE,f (f) ≥
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UE,f (g) if and only if min
t∈DfE
Etu(g)
Etu(f) ≤ 1, which implies that EtEu(g) ≤ EtEu(f) for some
tE ∈ DfE . Since Df = M(f), there exists t ∈ M(f) whose Bayesian update is tE .
Because f =Ec g, we have that U(f) =
1
φ(t)Etu(f) ≥ 1φ(t)Etu(g) ≥ 1φ(q)Equ(g) = U(g),
where q ∈M(g). This implies that f % g.
We now show that if Dh is a strict subset of La, Axiom 12 and therefore DC may be
violated. Consider the example of Section 1.1, with S = {s1, s2, s3} and E = {s1, s2}.
The agent has MEU ex ante preferences with u(x) = x and La being the convex
hull of the following three measures: p1 = (0.24, 0.33, 0.43), p2 = (0.34, 0.2, 0.46) and
p3 = (0.21, 0.68, 0.11). Note that MEU is a special case of confidence preferences, where
φ(p) = 1 if p ∈ La and 0 otherwise, whereas a = 1/2. As we showed there, f1  f2 and
M(f1) = p3, where f1 = (1, 0, 0) and f2 = (0, 1, 0).
Let Df1 ( La be the convex hull of p1 and p3, hence M(f1) ⊆ D and Df1E is the
convex hull of p1E and p3E . We then have that that if p ∈ DE , φE,f1(p) = φ(p3)kE,f1
Epu(f1)
Ep3u(f1)
,
otherwise φE,f1(p) = 0. By construction, LaE,f1 = DE .
We have UE,f1(f1) = min
p∈DE
1
φE,f1 (p)
Epu(f1) = min
p∈DE
kE,f1
φ(p3)
Ep3u(f1) =
kE,f1
φ(p3)
Ep3u(f1)
and UE,f1(f2) = min
p∈DE
1
φE,f1 (p)
Epu(f2) = min
p∈DE
kE,f1
φ(p3)
Ep3u(f1)
Epu(f2)
Epu(f1) =
kE,f1
φ(p3)
Ep3u(f1) min
p∈DE
p(s2)
p(s1)
.
Because p(s2) > p(s1) for all p ∈ DE , we have f2 E,f1 f1.
Proof of Lemma 5. Suppose Axioms 18, 19, f %∗ g, f =Ec g and f, g ∈ RS+. This
implies that f % af + (1 − a)g for all a ∈ [0, 1], where af + (1 − a)g denotes an act
from S to R+. Axioms 1, 19 imply that f % a⊗ f + (1− a)⊗ g for all a ∈ [0, 1]. Let
B = {h ∈ A : h = a⊗ f + (1− a)⊗ g, a ∈ [0, 1]} be a convex feasible set. We then have
that f is optimal in B. Axiom 18 implies f %E,f g, thus Axiom 14 is satisfied.
Proof of Lemma 6. Suppose Axiom 18, f %∗AA g and f =Ec g. This implies that
f % a⊗f+(1−a)⊗g for all a ∈ [0, 1]. Let B = {h ∈ A : h = a⊗f+(1−a)⊗g, a ∈ [0, 1]}
be a convex budget set. We then have that f is optimal in B. Applying Axiom 18, we
have f %E,f g and Axiom 20 is satisfied.
Conversely, suppose Axiom 20 and take (%, E, f,B) ∈ D with g ∈ B and f =Ec g.
Because f, g ∈ B and B is convex, a ⊗ f + (1 − a) ⊗ g ∈ B for all a ∈ [0, 1]. The
optimality of f implies that f % a ⊗ f + (1 − a) ⊗ g. Hence, f %∗AA g and Axiom 20
implies f %E,f g, so that Axiom 18 is satisfied.
Proof of Lemma 7. Let U : RS+ → RS be the function U(f) = (u(f(1), . . . , u(f(S)))),
giving ex post utilities in each state. For any f ∈ RS+, let DU(f) be the S ×
S diagonal matrix with diagonal given by the vector of ex post marginal utilities
(u′(f(1), . . . , u′(f(S)))). Let DU(f)(s) be the s-th element of the diagonal. From
Proposition 5 in RSS, the set of subjective beliefs is a singleton, given by pi(f) =
Eµ[φ′(Epu◦f)pDU(f)]
‖Eµ[φ′(Epu◦f)pDU(f)]‖ , where ‖Eµ[φ′(Epu◦f)pDU(f)]‖ =
∑
s′∈S
Eµ[φ′(Epu◦f)p(s′)]DU(f)(s′).
Given event E and act f , the subjective belief becomes piE(f) =
EµE,f [φ
′(EpEu◦f)pEDU(f)]
‖EµE,f [φ′(EpEu◦f)pEDU(f)]‖
.
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Let q = pi(f), with q(E) > 0 and q′ = piE,f (f). We need to show that for each
s ∈ E, q(s)q(E) = q′(s), or that
EµE,f [φ′(EpEu ◦ f)pE(s)]DU(f)(s)∑
s′∈E
EµE,f [φ′(EpEu ◦ f)pE(s′)]DU(f)(s′)
=
Eµ[φ′(Epu ◦ f)p(s)]DU(f)(s)∑
s′∈E
Eµ[φ′(Epu ◦ f)p(s′)]DU(f)(s′) . (5)
Set k(s) =
EµE,f [φ
′(EpEu◦f)pE(s)]
EµE,f [φ
′(EpEu◦f)]
=
Eµ[φ′(Epu◦f)p(s)]
Eµ[φ′(Epu◦f)]p(E) for all s ∈ E. By substituting the
equalities EµE,f [φ′(EpEu◦f)pE(s)] = k(s)EµE,f [φ′(EpEu◦f)] and Eµ[φ′(Epu◦f)p(s)] =
k(s)Eµ[φ′(Epu ◦ f)]p(E) in (5), Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs is satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 3. Fix j ∈ I. From Axioms 2 and 6 we have that H = G ≡
{s ∈ S : gi0 iΠi(s),f i f i for all i ∈ I} for some feasible allocation g0, as we can always
distribute a small enough portion of j’s allocation to everyone else. We subsequently
show that G cannot be common knowledge at any s, denoting g0 by g.
Because f is an ex ante efficient allocation, there does not exist a feasible allocation
h such that hi i f i for all i ∈ I. Suppose that there exists feasible allocation g
such that G is common knowledge at s ∈ S. Let F be a self evident event such
that s ∈ F ⊆ G. Note that each Πi partitions F . Then, we have that for each
i ∈ I, for each s′ ∈ F , gi i
Πi(s′),f i f
i. From Axiom 5, giΠi(s′)f i i
Πi(s′),f i f
i. From
Corollary 1, Axiom 14 is equivalent to Axiom 21. Using Axiom 21 and noting that
f i is strictly positive, giΠi(s′)f i i
Πi(s′),f i f
i implies that giΠi(s′)f i /∈ Ri(f i), hence
Ep(giΠi(s′)f i) > Epf i for all p ∈ pii(f i). Because this is true for all s′ ∈ S such that
Πi(s′) ⊆ F and Πi partitions F , we have that Ep(giFf i) > Epf i, for all p ∈ pii(f i).
Define hi = giFf i and h = {hi}i∈I .
Allocation f is interior, hence piui(f i) = piwi(f i) = pii(f i). Because Ephi > Epf i
for all p ∈ piwi(f i), we have that for small enough i, ihi + (1 − i)f i i f i. By
taking  < i for all i ∈ I, we have that hi + (1 − )f i i f i for all i ∈ I. Moreover,
h + (1 − )f is feasible because both f and h are feasible. Hence, f is not ex ante
efficient, a contradiction.
Conversely, suppose that {%1E,h}E∈E,h∈F fails Axiom 14 and therefore Axiom 21.
This means that for some event E ∈ E and acts f ∈ F+, g ∈ F , with f =Ec g, we have
g 1E,f f and Ep0g ≤ Ep0f for some p0 ∈ pi1u(f). Consider an economy with two agents,
1 and 2. Their information structure is identical, so that Π1 = Π2 = Π = {E,Ec}.
Let e = f + g. Agent 2 has preferences represented by expected utility. In particular,
h ∼2 h′ if and only if Ep0h = Ep0h′. His conditional preferences given E or Ec are
given by updating p0 using Bayes’ rule. This is well defined because Axiom 6 implies
Axiom 9, hence from Lemma 2 we have that p(E), p(Ec) > 0.
We next show that allocation h = {f, g} is ex ante Pareto efficient. Suppose
there exists allocation {x, y} such that x 1 f and y %2 g. Because p0 ∈ pi1u(f),
we have that Ep0x > Ep0f . Moreover, Ep0y ≥ Ep0g. These inequalities imply that
Ep0(x + y) > Ep0(f + g) = Ep0e, which implies that x + y 6= e, hence {x, y} is not
feasible. A similar argument applies if x %1 f and y 2 g.
Note that f %2 g because Ep0g ≤ Ep0f . Given E and since f =Ec g, we have that
Ep0Eg ≤ Ep0Ef , which implies f %2E,g g. Because g 1E f , at each s ∈ E it is common
32
knowledge that allocation h′ = {g, f} Pareto dominates h = {f, g}, hence there is
speculative trade.
Proof of Proposition 4. First note that because Axiom 7 implies Axiom 8, Proposition
1 implies that if information is (weakly) valuable then {%iE,h}i∈I,E∈E,h∈F satisfy Axiom
13 (Axiom 15), for each i ∈ I. Let e be the endowment and suppose partition Π1 is
finer than partition Π2. Let {gi}i∈I be admissible forM2 = {Π2, e}, defined as follows.
Let {gE2}E2∈Π2 be a tuple where, for each E2 ∈ Π2, gE2 is an equilibrium allocation
for economy 〈E2,%1E2,g1 , . . . ,%mE2,gm , e〉 with (normalized) prices pE2 ∈ ∆S, such that
p(s) = 0 if s /∈ E2. For each E2 ∈ Π2, let gi =E2 giE2 . From the first welfare theorem,
gE2 is Pareto optimal. From Proposition 9 in RSS, gE2 is a full insurance allocation.
From Axiom 6, pE2 > 0 for all s ∈ E2 and giE2(s) = EpE2ei, for all s ∈ E2 and all
i ∈ I. Hence, gE2 is also an interior allocation. Proposition 9 in RSS implies that
pE2 ∈ ⋂i piiE2,gi .
Proposition 1 in RSS shows that piE,gi(f) = pi
ui
E,gi
(f) for all strictly positive acts.
Moreover, Axiom 6 implies Axiom 9. Lemma 2 implies pE2(E1) > 0. It is straight-
forward that we can use the proof of Proposition 2, but applying Axiom 17 instead of
Axiom 14, to show that there is Bayesian updating of subjective beliefs at a constant
act, between any events F,E ∈ E , where E ⊆ F . We therefore have pE2E1 ∈
⋂
i pi
i
E1
, for
each E1 ⊆ E2, where E1 ∈ Π1 and pE2E1 is the Bayesian update of pE2 on E1.
Define allocation {f i}i∈I as follows. If E1 ⊆ E2, where E1 ∈ Π1 and E2 ∈ Π2, then
f i =E1 f
i
E1
, where fE1 = (f
1
E1
, . . . , fmE1) is such that, for each i ∈ I, f iE1(s) = EpE2E1e
i
for all s ∈ E1. Hence, each fE1 is a full insurance allocation. Because pE2E1 ∈ piiE1 , f iE1
is weakly preferred to each act h that is affordable given prices pE2E1 . Because fE1 is
feasible, it is an equilibrium allocation of economy (E1,%1E1,f1 , . . . ,%
m
E1,fm
, e).
By construction, EpE2f i = EpE2giE2 . Because p
E2 ∈ ⋂i piiE2 , we have that giE2 %iE2,gi
f i, for all i ∈ I and all E2 ∈ Π2. Axiom 5 implies that gi %iE2,gi f i for each E2 ∈ Π2
and each i ∈ I.
Enumerate the partition cells of Π2 = {E1, . . . , En}. If n = 1 then Π2 = {S} is
the uninformative partition and gi %i f i for each i ∈ I, so we are done. Suppose that
n ≥ 2. For cell 1 ≤ k ≤ n define act hik as follows. Let hik(s) = gi(s) if s ∈ Ej , where
1 ≤ j ≤ k, and hik(s) = f i(s) otherwise. Note that hin = gi and let hi0 = f i. For each
1 ≤ k ≤ n, from Axiom 5, we have that gi %i
Ek,gi
f i implies hik %iEk,gi h
i
k−1. Axiom
11 implies hik %iEk,hik h
i
k−1. Applying Axiom 13 we have h
i
k %i hik−1. By Axiom 1, we
have that gi %i f i, for each i ∈ I, which implies that M1 is not more valuable than
M2. Therefore, public information is not valuable.
For the second claim, for each E2 ∈ Π2 define hiE2 = giE2E2f i. From Axiom 5,
giE2 %
i
E2,gi
f i implies hiE2 %
i
E2,gi
f i. Axiom 11 implies hiE2 %
i
E2,hiE2
f i. From Axiom 15
and using Corollary 1, either hiE2 %
i f i or f i i hiE2 and hiE2 /∈ Ri(f i). If hiE2 %i f i,
Axiom 7 implies that for all a ∈ (0, 1), ahiE2 + (1 − a)f i i f i. This means that
Ep(ahiE2 + (1 − a)f i) > Epf i for all p ∈ pii(f i), or that EphiE2 > Epf i. Hence, in
both cases we have that EphiE2 > Epf
i for all p ∈ pii(f i). Repeating this argument
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for all E2 ∈ Π2, we have that Epgi > Epf i for all p ∈ pii(f i). By definition, for small
enough i > 0, igi + (1 − i)f i i f i. By taking  < i for all i ∈ I, we have that
gi + (1− )f i i f i for all i ∈ I, hence public information is weakly not valuable.
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